# Kritik 1NC

## Off Case

### Pomo K

The affirmative’s modern approach to truth is meaningless; it seeks to impose order on a fundamentally chaotic universe. **Gough 5** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

[Brackets in original] Some literary critics see the detective story as the characteristic genre of modernist storytelling. For example, Brian McHale argues that modernist ﬁction usually involves ‘a quest for a missing or hidden item of knowledge’ (1992: 146) and that ‘a modernist novel looks like a detective story’, centrally concerned with ‘problems of the accessibility and circulation of knowledge, the individual mind’s grappling with an elusive or occluded reality’ (1992: 147). **The detective is the archetypal modernist subject, a** quest(ion)ing **‘cognitive hero’**,an ‘agent of recognitions . . . reduced synecdochically to the organ of visual perception, the (private) eye’ (1992: 147), **seeking to understand a uniﬁed and objective world.** The postmodern turn in detective ﬁction (which may have preceded an analogous transformation of social research) is signalled by the emergence of ‘anti-detective’ stories that evoke the impulse to ‘detect’ in order to frustrate it by refusing to solve the crime. One of the most celebrated anti-detective stories is Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose (1983) which takes some well-known examples of generic detective ﬁction as its intertextual models, but – as Eco himself puts it – ‘is a mystery in which very little is discovered and the detective is defeated’ (1984: 54). In The Name of the Rose, Eco uses the form of detective ﬁction to deconstruct, disrupt and undermine the rationality of the models of conjecture conventionally provided by the form – which is why, as Eco writes, his ‘basic story (whodunit?) ramiﬁes into so many other stories, all stories of other conjectures, all linked with the structure of conjecture as such’ (1984: 57). Eco provides a physical model of conjecturality in the abbey’s labyrinthine library but also demonstrates that his detective – William of Baskerville – cannot decipher the complex social milieu of the abbey by assuming that it has a comparably logical (albeit complicated) structure. Following Deleuze and Guattari (1987),Eco likens ‘the structure of conjecture’ to the inﬁnite networks of a rhizome rather than to the ﬁnite and hierarchical roots and branches of a tree: **The rhizome is so constructed that every path can be connected with every other one. It has no center, no periphery**, no exit, **because it is potentially inﬁnite.** The space of conjecture is a rhizome space . . . **the world** in which William realizes he is living already **has a rhizome structure:** that is, **it can be structured but** is **never** structured **deﬁnitively** . . . it is impossible for there to be a story. (1984: 57–8) Thus the anti-detective story not only subverts the rationality of the investigatory methods modelled by conventional detective ﬁction but also denies the defensibility of the dominant cultural expectations that animate such enquiries, namely ‘the longing for ‘‘one true story’’ that has been the psychic motor for [modern] Western science’ (Harding, 1986: 193). Eco’s story of William’s ‘failure’ as a (modernist) detective is riddled with implicit and explicit references to postmodernist inquiry strategies, as in the following conversation between William and his ‘Watson’, Adso: ‘What I did not understand was the relation among signs . . . I behaved stubbornly, pursuing a semblance of order, when I should have known well that **there is no order in the universe.**’‘But in imagining an erroneous order you still found something . . .’ ‘What you say is very ﬁne Adso, and I thank you. The **order that our mind imagines is like a** net, or like a **ladder**, built to attain something. But afterward **you must throw the ladder away, because you discover that, even if it was useful, it was meaningless** . . . The only truths that are useful are instruments to be thrown away.’ (1983: 492) The Name of the Rose is itself such an ‘erroneous order’, which Eco emphasizes by using metaﬁctional narrative strategies to expose its status as ﬁction and draw attention to the processes by which it is constructed both as a world to be explored and the means of its own exploration. Thus the more appropriate models for postmodernist social researchers are not detectives like Sherlock Holmes, Miss Marple, Philip Marlowe or Kate Fansler, but authors like Umberto Eco. **Our work is to fathom the mysteries we inscribe.**

The aff’s imposition of order is part and parcel of their strict insistence on tradition. Upholding tradition promotes authoritarian and dogmatic forms of thought. Critical self-reflection that calls tradition into question is essential to freedom.

**Kim 11** summarizes Habermas[[2]](#footnote-2)

This early work anticipates aspects of his later theory insofar as it ties together the empirical and the transcendental (Habermas, 1986a:197). As we saw in Section 4.3 universal pragmatics has a similar structure: everyday language (the empirical) and a counterfactually presupposed set of validity claims (the ‘transcendental’). The concept of knowledge-constitutive interests are, in Habermas’s language, ‘quasi-transcendental’ (Held, 1980:255). The three knowledgeconstitutive interests correspond to three domains of social life: labour (empirical-analytical), language (historical-hermeneutic), and what might be more vaguely described as ‘emancipation’ (critical reflection). This third domain – **critical reflection** – is articulated as **the emancipatory interest in overcoming authoritarian and dogmatic structures of thought** and action (Held, 1980:255). Since this is central to Habermas’s critique of Gadamer I will focus on it here. Essentially, it may be stated that critical reflection has the aim of recreating a 104completely uninhibited subjectivity. Habermas states that, ‘this interest can only develop to the degree to which repressive force, in the form of the normative exercise of power, presents itself permanently in structures of distorted communication – that is to the extent that domination is institutionalised’ (Habermas, 1973b:9). Habermas links the emancipatory interest to critical reflection and argues that **critical reflection not only unveils** the **concealed ‘structures of distortion’, but dissolves** the **‘effects of distortion’** (Sinclair, 2005:230). Hence Habermas endorses the importance of the emancipatory characteristic of critical reflection as follows: The experience of reflection articulates itself substantially in the concept of a selfformative process. Methodologically it leads to a standpoint from which the identity of reason with the will of reason freely arises. In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in autonomy and responsibility. For the pursuit of reflection knows itself as a movement of emancipation. Reason is at the same time subject to the interest in reason. We can say that it obeys an emancipatory cognitive interest which aims at the pursuit of reflection. (Habermas, 1982:198) Habermas asserts that epistemology is only possible as social theory; moreover, critique is viable only in instances where ‘reason is at the same time subject to the interest in reason’ (Habermas, 1973b:198). In other words, reason that is not tied to human interests – or awareness of human interests – cannot serve the end of emancipation. In his later work this is expressed in the idea of communicative reason, as distinct from strategic reason: in becoming aware that we raise validity claims we also become aware of the emancipatory potential of reason. Habermas further maintains that ‘the hypothetical construct which I will call knowledge-constitutive or knowledge-guiding interest is supposed to enable us to understand the systematic (though conditional) embeddedness of discursively produced theoretical knowledge in the practice of a form of life which can only reproduce itself with the aid of potentially true statements’ (Habermas, 1973a:180-181). To explain: there is a mutual entanglement of truth and social life. Scientific practices are embedded in social life, but society must be guided by the pursuit of truth. Habermas is not, of course, concerned exclusively with Gadamer, but his notion of **‘critical self-reflection’**, tied to knowledge-constitutive interests, **is central to** his **critique of Gadamer**ian hermeneutics. So what exactly is ‘critical self-reflection’? Habermas refers to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit by suggesting that it is ‘the critical dissolution of subjectively constituted pseudo-objectivity’ whereby, **through gaining** an **understanding of** the 105**delusions of ‘false consciousness’,** an individual is able to ‘emancipate itself from itself’ (Habermas, 1973a:182-183). **Critical self-reflection is** then the **dissolution of historically produced reifications of consciousness, which is precisely what** Habermas thinks **Gadamer is engaged in through** his **positive evaluation of tradition, and** the **prejudices that underlie tradition**. The only way that such reifications can be dissolved is through communicative action, although Habermas only gradually formulated a theory that embodied the emancipatory potential of language.

Academic spaces are poisoned by metanarratives; the aff seeks to justify pre-existing traditions through transcendental truths about moral identity. The aff has elevated what society lets us say to the pedestal of objective representation

**Peters 95** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

Lyotard then defines postmodern as "incredulity toward metanarratives," a distrust of "stories" that purport to justify certain practices or institutions by grounding them upon a set of transcendental, ahistorical, or universal principles. This incredulity is a product, Lyotard maintains, of progress in the sciences, specifically, a change in the way we practice science. Here Lyotard is linking up and referring in an anecdotal way to the crisis in metaphysical philosophy, pointed to in the English-speaking world by the historical theories of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. It seems, however, that Lyotard takes such theories as indicating that we actually conduct scientific research in a way different from the one used by those who practiced science in the Newtonian period, rather than thinking of the recent debunking of the empiricist model of science as simply repudiating a bad account. [32](http://www.questia.com/9637590)  **The metanarrative provided by** the "crowning" science of **speculative philosophy legitimated the university** institution that was modeled **along principles of emancipationist humanism.** **Youth from the liberal élite-"the heroes of knowledge"--were trained in** the great task of **pursuing good ethico-political ends and** leading their countries toward **social progress.** This is part of the legacy of the Enlightenment narrative now under scrutiny: "To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it." [33](http://www.questia.com/9637590)  **The crisis of metaphysical philosophy and the bankruptcy of ahistorical** theories of **justification are linked** up, by way of an aesthetic thematic in Lyotard's work, **with the** so-called **crisis of representation, in which an essentially realist epistemology based on a mirror theory of knowledge** and art **conceives of representation as the reproduction of an external reality.** English-speaking readers will recognize the theme as it has been recently explored by the American "pragmatist" Richard Rorty in his reworking of the history of modern analytic philosophy. [34](http://www.questia.com/9637590) Beginning his interpretation with a quotation from Wittgenstein Vermischte Bemerkungen, which likens progress in philosophy to the finding of a remedy for itching, a physicianlike Rorty diagnoses modern analytic philosophy as simply one more variant of Kantian philosophy that is distinguished from its parent predecessor by its thinking of representation in linguistic terms and of philosophy of language as exhibiting the "foundations of knowledge." Significantly, **Rorty** argues for a position termed "epistemological behaviorism," which **explains rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say rather than vice versa. Divested** of the **captivating mirror imagery, philosophy can** then **be seen** simply **as part of the social** practice of **conversation.**

3 impacts.

a. The aff’s approach to philosophy is self-undermining; in its abstraction, modern philosophy is subordinated to existing power structures based on grand narratives of efficiency. The kritik is not a rejection of truth, rather modernity’s abstract understanding of it, divorced from social context. **Peters 95** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

A similar scenario can be plotted for education--the transmission of knowledge--which is also to be legitimated in terms of the performative (i.e., efficiency) criterion. It is at this point that Lyotard answers the questions that pertain to a university policy (mentioned in the introduction of this article). **The goal for the university becomes** its **optimal contribution to** the best performance of **the social system.** This goal demands the creation of two kinds of skills indispensable to the maintenance of the social system: Those necessary to enhance competitiveness in the world market and those necessary for fulfilling the need for its internal cohesion. The first, Lyotard predicts, will lead to the growth of demand for middlemanagement executives in leading sectors and priority in education being given to any discipline that can demonstrate an applicability to training in "telematics" (computer science, sybernetics, mathematics, and so on). The second, within the context of delegitimation, will no longer regard the transmission of knowledge as the training of an elite capable of guiding society toward its emancipation but will simply "supply the system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions." [60](http://www.questia.com/9637591)  Accordingly, **two categories of students will emerge** more strongly**, those who reproduce the technical and the professional intelligentsia.** In addition to its professionalist function, **the university will** come also to improve the system's performance through an increasing role in the realms of job retraining and continuing education. There is a changing emphasis from transmitting knowledge en bloc to young people before they join the workforce to one that serves working adults, à la carte, to help them improve their skills and widen occupation horizons. 35 The general effect of the performativity principle is to **subordinate** the institutions of **higher learning to the existing power**, that is, **in terms of legitimating myths, subordinating truth** (as it figures in the emancipatory narrative) **to efficiency and power.** Lyotard writes: The notion of "university franchise" now belongs to a bygone era. The "autonomy" granted the universities after the crisis of the late 1960's has very little meaning given the fact that practically nowhere do teachers' groups have the power to decide what the budget of their institution will be; all they can do is allocate the funds that are assigned to them, and only then as the last step in the process. [61](http://www.questia.com/9637591)  New technologies will alter the medium of the transmission of knowledge--almost a truism in the postmodern age--and elementary training in informatics may become a compulsory requirement in the same way as a foreign language proficiency was/is a requirement in the modern university. Replacement of teachers by machines and technicians is only repugnant within the old master narrative of emancipationist humanism: **The question** (overt or implied) **now asked by the** professional **student**, the State, or institutions of higher education **is no longer "Is it true?" but** "What use is it?" In the context of the mercantilisation of knowledge, more often than not this question is equivalent to: **"Is it saleable?"** And in the context of power-growth: "Is it efficient?" [62](http://www.questia.com/9637591)

This lends way to technocracy, which homogenizes the world and guarantees violence. Technocracy is epistemologically problematic; it relies on a false objectivity.

**Lyotard 79** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

At risk of scandalizing the reader, I would also say that the system can count severity among its advantages. Within the framework of the power criterion, a request (that is, a form of prescription) aims nothing in legitimacy by virtue of being based on the hardship of an unmet need. Rights do not flow from hardship, but from the fact that the alleviation of hardship improves the system's performance. The needs of the most underprivileged should not be used as a system regulator as a matter of principle: since the means of satisfying them is already known, their actual satisfaction will not improve the system's performance, but only increase its expenditures. The only counterindication is that not satisfying them can destabilize the whole. It is against the nature of force to be ruled by weakness. But it is in its nature to induce new requests meant to lead to a redefinition of the norms of "life."218 In this sense, the system seems to be a vanguard machine dragging humanity after it, dehumanizing it in order to rehumanize it at a different level of normative capacity. **The technocrats** declare that they cannot trust what society designates as its needs; they **"know" that** **society cannot know its own needs** since they are not variables independent of the new technologies.219 **Such is the arrogance of** the **decision makers-and their blindness.** What their "arrogance" means is that **they identify themselves with** the social system conceived as a **totality in quest of** its most **performative unity** possible. If we look at the pragmatics of science, we learn that such an identification is impossible: in principle, no scientist embodies knowledge or neglects the "needs" of a research project, or the aspirations of a researcher, on the pretext that they do not add to the performance of "science" as a whole. The response a researcher usually makes to a request is: "We'll have to see, tell me your story.” In principle, he does not prejudge that a case has already been closed or that the power of "science" will suffer if it is reopened. In fact, 'the opposite is true. Of course, it does not always happen like this in reality. Countless scientists have seen their "move" ignored or repressed, sometimes for decades, because it too abruptly destabilized the accepted positions, not only in the university and scientific hierarchy, bur also in the problematic.221 **The stronger the "move," the more likely it is** to be **denied** the minimum **consensus,** precisely because it changes the rules of the game upon which consensus had been based. But when **the institution of knowledge** functions in this manner, it **is** acting like an ordinary power center whose behavior is **governed by** a principle of **homeostasis.** Such behavior is terrorist, as is the behavior of the system described by Luhmann. By terror I mean the efficiency gained by eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, **a player** from the language game one shares with him. He **is silenced** or consents**, not because he has been refuted, but** because **his ability to participate has been threatened** (there are many ways to prevent someone from playing), **The decision makers' arrogance**, which in principle has no equivalent in the sciences, **consists in** the exercise of **terror.** It says: **"Adapt your aspirations to our ends-or else.”**

b. Modernity makes extinction inevitable. Their metanarrative of progress is disastrous for the biosphere. The alternative allows for rethinking our understanding of the environment. **White 98** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

**The project of modernity** – from the Gaian viewpoint of Lovelock, the colonization of the earth – conceivably **entails** no less than **splitting the biosphere itself, and so** human **extinction, as the final product of progress.** As Bateson argues, **we can destroy the world with the best of intentions.** Consider the ecological notion, articulated by Bateson, that **the “unit of survival” is not**, as Darwinism postulates, the individual organism, or species, **as social Darwinism would have it, entrepreneur, or** enterprise or nation or **class – a view** that leads to the further, modernist assumption **that** the survival unit, **“man,” must** struggle against and **attempt to dominate nature**, or “we” must overcome “them,” using the most efficient means at his/our disposal. What tenaciously lives is, instead, a heterogenous pattern involving both “organism” and “environment,” “us” and “them.” At Bateson argues, “**the unit of survival is a flexible organism-in-its environment**” (457). Or, as Heidegger would say, living is “being open”, Dasein. What does not live for long in evolutionary ecology is a “species” that embodies the modernist paradigm: It is now empirically clear that Darwinian evolutionary theory contained a very great error in its identification of the unit of survival under natural selection. The unit which was believed to be crucial and around which the theory was set up was either the breeding individual or the family line or the sub-species or some similar homogenous set of conspecifics. Now I suggest that the last hundred years have demonstrated empirically that if an organism or aggregate of organisms sets to work with a focus on its own survival and thinks that is the way to select its adaptive moves, its **“progress” ends up with a destroyed environment.** If the organism ends up destroying its environment, it has in fact destroyed itself. (457) **The word “species”** is the English form of the Latin species, which **is** in turn **the translation of the Greek** idea, the word, often rendered in English as **“Form,” as the basis of Plato’s theory of** Forms and of Aristotle’s natural kinds. The Forms are the objects of **knowledge** as well as the organizing divisions of the world, the archetypes or in modern terms “geno-types” on which the phenotypes of natural entities are patterned. **A rational account of nature was called logos,** and indeed Aristotle formalized the principles of correct reasoning as “logic.” The Socratic intellect evident in Plato’s Dialogues subjected the “storis” (muthoi, “myths”) of the Homeric tradition, to rational analysis, **subordinating** mythos to logos, or **myth to logic** (see Nestle, Havelock).Stories, or myths, are arguably encoded in a fashion similar to the ecologies of organisms and, though some Darwinists might scoff, **evolution might be described**, so Bateson thinks, **as a kind of story.**

c. The aff’s normative visions are utopian. Their speech act is one of mastery of knowledge, but promotion of rational understanding has failed to save us from violence and oppression. As long as we cling to the aff’s linear and simplistic understanding of history and progress, modernity’s latent side-effects can’t be addressed.

**Best and Kellner 98** write[[7]](#footnote-7)

Generally characterized, the project of modern politics was to define and implement universal goals like freedom, equality, and justice, in an attempt to transform institutional structures of domination. Modern politics emerged from the Enlightenment project of subjecting to critique by the norms of reason all forms of authority and all existing institutions. Modern politics presupposed a democratic public sphere where individuals and social groups could discuss political problems and choices, and intervene practically in public affairs. **Modern politics involved attempts to discern basic human rights, the common good and universal values, and** to **provide institutional guarantees** that allow democratic rights, discussion, and consensus. Thus, **the American Revolution declared** the **universal rights of "all people" to be "self-evident truths"** as **revealed by** the light of **Reason.** The French Revolution championed the universal "Rights of Man" on the basis of liberty, egality, fraternity and Mary Wollstonecraft published a treatise Vindication of the Rights of Women shortly thereafter .[2] Attempting to realize these universal appeals beyond the limiting context of bourgeois class relations, Marx urged that the "Workers of the World Unite!" to create an international politics of solidarity designed to overthrow bourgeois property forms. In the Americas and then in Africa, Asia, and throughout the non-Western world, national liberation movements emerged which challenged colonialism and sought to bring the promises of modern democracy and liberty to areas of the world sunk in oppression. Simon Bolivar's struggles for Latin American freedom, the slave revolts of the Caribbean, and Jose Marti's vision of Nuestra America , free of colonial domination, articulated the yearnings unleashed by the modern project and attempts to realize its promises, where later liberation movements claimed that only socialism can redeem the sufferings of the "wretched of the earth" and realize the promises of modernity. **Yet the** promises and **yearnings of modernity** and modern politics **were seldom realized. Workers were exploited** throughout the modern epoch **by** rapacious **capital; women** were only able to gain full democratic rights by the early decades of the 20th century and **continued to suffer patriarchal domination; people of color were systematically discriminated against** by the forces of racism**; and** the **developing countries continued to be oppressed by** the **imperialist powers. Despite** war, poverty, hunger, economic depression, and fierce forms of **subjugation and suffering, modern politics was optimistic** in its outlook; indeed, **it was** often **religious in its** **teleological faith that the progressive logic of history would soon be realized.** Enlightenment faith in a better future inspired liberalism and Marxism alike. Thus, modern politics was informed by strong normative values and utopian visions of a world of universal freedom, equality, and harmony.

The alternative is to embrace language games. Prescriptive statements within the debate space cannot be considered foundationally true representations but “moves” in a game that change the game itself. This is the only way to resist the worst forms of technocratic violence. **Peters 95** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

It is clear that at the heart of Lyotard's position is a playful reading of the later Wittgenstein, which emphasizes the pluralistic nature of language games. **Each** of the various types of **utterance**--denotative, prescriptive, performative, and so on--**comprises a language game** with its own body of rules defining its properties and uses. The rules are irreducible, and there exists an incommensurability among different games. Lyotard adds three further observations about language games. First, **the rules** do not have a bedrock justification, nor do they **carry** with themselves **their own legitimation.** Where Wittgenstein might say that they are constituted by agreement in practice, Lyotard says **they are the object of a contract**, explicit or not, **between players.** Second, "if there are no rules there is no game"; and third, "**every utterance should be thought of as a 'move' in a game.**" [41](http://www.questia.com/9637591) Two principles underlie the method as a whole: "To speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistics." [42](http://www.questia.com/9637591) As Fredric Jameson explains, utterances are not conceived of either as a process of the transmission of information or messages, or a network of signs, or signifying systems (structuralism, semiotics); rather, they are seen as an agonistics of language, as an unstable exchange between communicational adversaries. [43](http://www.questia.com/9637591) The example Lyotard uses is that of playing cards: a "move" in the game is like the taking (or trumping) of a trick. The second principle elevates this conflictual view of language as a model for understanding the nature of the social bond (and science itself). While there are many different language games, Lyotard asserts, and each of us lives at the intersection of many of these, the **decision makers** proceed on the assumption that there is commensurability and common ground among them and that the whole is determinable. They **allocate our lives for** the growth of **power**. In matters of social justice **and** scientific truth alike, the legitimation of that power is based on its optimising the system's performance--**efficiency.** The **application of this criterion to all of our games** necessarily **entails** a certain level of **terror**, whether soft or hard**: be operational** (that is, commensurable) **or disappear.** [44](http://www.questia.com/9637591)  In a later work, Lyotard more openly acknowledges his intellectual debt to the later Wittgenstein. Taking his cue from Theodor Adorno, he champions the "micrologic" in opposition to the speculative--the grand narrative of Hegelian philosophy--and asserts that "another perspective has been opened up through which it may be possible to measure up to the crisis [of metaphysics] and the reflective response it demands. This perspective is pointed to notably in the Philosophische Untersuchungen and Zettel, under the programmatical name of Sprachsielen." [45](http://www.questia.com/9637591)  Lyotard proceeds to argue for his interpretation and to enumerate characteristics of the language game: The concept has its home in the language game; the language game is to be taken in the plural (they are "numerous, even unnumerable"); the rules of various language games are irreducible to one another; a sentence is a move in the game and can establish a new rule (and so a new game). He claims, "We are worlds away from necessary linkages, but are at the heart of equivocity," an equivocity "such that the task of expressing it . . . runs into an indefinite number of series of other moves belonging to an irreducibly heteronomous multiplicity of games." [46](http://www.questia.com/9637591)  Lyotard's interpretation of the **language games** as heteronomous ("the untranslatability of one game into another") and paralogous ("the search for the limit between the tolerable and the intolerable by way of moves lacking any given model") **shatter**s **the grand** legitimating **metanarrative of science as the supreme voice of reason.** Lyotard writes: "**Science plays its own game; it is incapable of legitimating** the **other language games**. The game of prescription, for example, escapes it. But above all it is incapable of legitimating itself, as speculation assumed it could." [47](http://www.questia.com/9637591)  For Lyotard there is no principle of unitotality; there is no universal metalanguage. The reality is that there are many languages and, as Wittgenstein argued ( Lyotard notes), new languages are added to the old ones, like suburbs of an old town. Lyotard acknowledges Wittgenstein's examples of the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of infinitesimal calculus. Less than fifty years on, he argues, we can substantially add to the list: Lyotard mentions the growth of machine languages, the matrices of game theory, new systems of musical notation, systems of notation for nondenotative forms of logic, the language of the genetic code, graphs of phonological structures, and so on. [48](http://www.questia.com/9637591)  **The proliferation and splintering of language games, which prevents** an **overall mastery, allows him to claim that "**speculative or **humanistic philosophy is forced to relinquish its legitimation duties**, which explains why philosophy is facing a crisis wherever it persists in arrogating such functions and is reduced to the study of systems of logic or the history of ideas where it has been realistic enough to surrender them." [49](http://www.questia.com/9637591)

The alternative is not a form of nihilism but improves upon Enlightenment ideals, so it’s a comparatively better way of engaging in moral reasoning.

**Best and Kellner 98** write[[9]](#footnote-9)

According to Mouffe, Enlightenment universalism was instrumental in the emergence of democratic discourse, but "it has become an obstacle in the path of understanding those new forms of politics, characteristic of our societies today, which demand to be approached from a nonessentialist perspective. Hence, the necessity of using the theoretical tools elaborated by the different currents of what can be called the postmodern in philosophy and of appropriating their critique of rationalism and subjectivism."[6] Universal values are not entirely abandoned -- e.g., the concept that everyone has certain rights -- but they enter into a "new kind of articulation" with particular values and a logic of irreducible difference. Yet for this postmodern politics, the **rejection of** essentialism and lack of solid **"foundations" does not entail nihilism** or the abandonment of the global political project. As Laclau puts it: Abandonment of the myth of foundations does not lead to nihilism**, just as uncertainty as to how an enemy will attack does not lead to passivity. It leads**, rather, **to** a **proliferation of discursive interventions** and arguments that are necessary, **because there is no extradiscursive reality that discourse might simply reflect.** Inasmuch as argument and discourse constitute the social, their open- ended character becomes the source of a greater activism and a more radical libertarianism. **Humankind, having always bowed to external forces** -- God, Nature, the necessary laws of History -- **can** now, at the threshold of postmodernity, **consider itself** for the first time thecreator and **constructor of its own history.** The dissolution of the myth of foundations -- and the concomitant dissolution of the category `subject' -- further radicalizes the emancipatory possibilities offered by the Enlightenment and Marxism.[7]The **shift to** a **postmodern logic**, in other words, **leads to "**an **awareness of** the **complex strategic-discursive operations implied by** [the] **defense" of Enlightenment values**.[8] Thus, for Laclau and Mouffe postmodern philosophy and social theory do[es] not entail a rejection of key political commitments to modernity itself. For them, **nothing in the radical political project is lost** with the rejection of foundationalism **and everything is gained through** the **liberating effects of a new logic of difference and contingency.** In Mouffe's words, "far from seeing the development of postmodern philosophy as a threat, **radical democracy welcomes it as** an **indispensable** instrument in the accomplishment of its goals."[9] To speak ironically, we could say that the postmodern critique puts the modern project on even firmer "grounds" than Enlightenment rationality, insofar as its values are not simply dogmatically stated, but are given pragmatic and consensual grounds of justification. Hence, their approach is very similar to that of Habermas, who sees the Enlightenment as an "unfinished project" and seeks communicative grounds of normative justification, with the key difference that Laclau and Mouffe believe that postmodern theory has radical democratic potential, whereas Habermas believes that it weakens the Enlightenment tradition and aids irrationalist, conservative, traditions.

No perms—the aff’s representations of tradition aren’t conducive to a genuine language game

**Kim 11** summarizes Habermas[[10]](#footnote-10)

In Habermas’s view Gadamer adopts a perspective on tradition and language which places too much weight on empirical agreement, as distinct from ‘coming to an understanding’ from a standpoint of equality. Furthermore, ‘understanding’ and ‘interpretation’ are, Habermas suggests, analytically distinct, but Gadamer fails to explain or even acknowledge this fact (Holub, 1991:46). Subsequently, there is present **in Gadamer’s work** an uncritical ‘nostalgia’ and **the concept of ‘understanding’ is so hermeneutically rooted that social criticism is impossible** (Kaplan, 2003:41). **Gadamer**, in effect, **reifies social life, viewing tradition as an ‘objective’ context** (Habermas, 1986b:313). The relation that Gadamer posits between understanding and prejudice, authority, and tradition is characterised by the assimilation and preservation of conventional and existing norms: ‘Gadamer, if I am correct, is of the opinion that the hermeneutical elucidation of unintelligible or misunderstood expression must refer back to a prior consensus which has been reliably worked out in the dialogue of a convergent tradition.’ (Habermas, 1986b:313). With this in mind, it is clear that Habermas links Gadamer with traditional hermeneutics, which saw its task as the avoidance of misunderstanding. Tradition is thus considered to be ‘objective for us, in the sense that it cannot be confronted with a claim to truth in principle’ (Habermas, 1986b:313). **As a result of the account of** the inherently prejudiced character of all **understanding provided by Gadamer, it is not only impractical to question** the **consensus** around tradition **but also pointless** (Habermas, 1986b:313). In Habermas’ view, Gadamer has ‘further used hermeneutical insight into the prejudicial structure of understanding to restrict the quest for enlightenment to the horizon of prevailing convictions’ (Habermas, 1986b:316): **We have good reason to suspect that** the **background consensus of established traditions** and language games **can be a consciousness forged of compulsions, a result of pseudo-communication**, not only in the pathologically isolated case of disturbed familial systems, but **in entire social systems** as well. The **freedom of movement of a hermeneutical understanding** widened into critique, **therefore, ought not to be linked to** the free play available within the tradition and **prevailing convictions**. (Habermas, 1986b:317)

You should adopt a mindset of epistemic suspicion toward the aff’s totalizing moral claims. Epistemic suspicion prioritizes the question of the kritik over the advocacy of the affirmative. This approach is best because it leads to a pragmatic ethics which revitalizes the public sphere.

**Seidman 94** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

This **epistemic suspicion is at the core of postmodernism.** Postmodernists challenge the charge of theory as a foundational discourse. The postmodern critique does not deny the possibility of success in the quest for foundations. I urge **only** that **from the** standpoint of the history of such foundational efforts, and from the **vantage point of modern consciousness**, which itself has generated this relentless epistemic doubt, **this project does not seem** compelling or **credible.** Aside from this epistemic doubt, there are practical and moral reasons to consider in assessing the value of the foundational project. Postmodernists view such discourses as exhibiting a bad faith: concealed in the will to truth is a will to power. To claim that there are universal and objective reasons to warrant a social discourse, to claim that a discourse speaks the language of truth, is to privilege that discourse, its carriers, and its social agenda. Insofar as we believe that social discourses are social practices which, like other social forces, shape social life and history, **privileging a discourse as true authorizes its social** values and **agenda** (Brown 1990). Social discourses, especially the broad social narratives of development produced by sociological theorists, but also the specialized discourses produced by demographers, criminologists, organizational sociologists, and so on, shape the social world **by creating normative frameworks of** racial, gender, sexual, national, and other types of **identity,** social **order, and institution**al functioning **that carry the** intellectual and social **authority of science**. A discourse that bears the stamp of scientific knowledge gives its normative concepts of identity and order an authority **while discrediting** the social agendas produced by **other** (scientific and nonscientific) **discourses.** To claim to have discovered the true language of society delegitimates rival paradigms - now described as merely ideological or, at best, as precursors - and their social agendas and carriers. It entails a demand to marginalize or withdraw privilege and its rewards from these rivals. Indeed, to claim epistemic privilege for a social discourse is to demand social authority not only for its social agenda but also for its producers and carriers. To assert that a social discourse speaks a universally valid language of truth confers legitimacy on its social values and its carriers. In a word, the politics of epistemology is bound up with social struggles to shape history. **When one appeals solely to the truth of a discourse** to authorize it intellectually and socially**, one represses reflection on its practical-moral meaning and** its **social consequences**. A discourse that justifies itself solely by epistemic appeals will not be compelled to defend its conceptual decisions on moral and political grounds. The practical and moral significance of the discourse will go unattended or else will be considered only in the most cursory way. On the other hand, if theorists - as postmodernists - believe that all appeals to universal standards or justificatory strategies are not ultimately compelling, they will be forced to offer "local" moral, social, and political reasons for their conceptual decisions. Disputes between rival theories or conceptual strategies would not concern epistemic first principles - e.g., individualism versus holism, materialism versus idealism, micro-versus macro-level analysis, instrumental versus normative concepts of action and order. Instead theorists would argue about the intellectual, social, moral, and political consequences of choosing one conceptual strategy or another. **A pragmatic turn** has distinct advantages. It **expands the number of parties who may participate** more or less **as equals in** a **debate about society. Where** a **discourse is redeemed** ultimately **by metatheoretical appeals,** experts step forward as the authorities. This situation contributes to the enfeeblement of a vital public realm of moral and political debate because **social questions are deemed the domain of experts.** By contrast, **when** a **discourse is judged by its practical consequences** or its moral implications**, more citizens are qualified to assess** it by considering **its social and moral implications**. A pragmatic move, in principle, implies an active, politically engaged citizenry participating **in a democratic public realm**. Postmodernism contests a representational concept of science whose legitimacy hinges on an increasingly cynical belief in science's enlightening 126 Steven Seidman and empowering role. This Enlightenment legitimation obscures the social entanglement of the disciplines and permits them to abandon moral responsibility for their own social efficacy. Postmodernism underscores the practical and moral character of science. It sees the disciplines as implicated in heterogeneous struggles around gender, race, sexuality, the body, and the mind, to shape humanity.

## Case

### K First

K outweighs—2 warrants

1. Fiat’s illusory. Voting aff doesn’t actually ensure people receive a living wage, but the ballot can have a tangible impact on the mindsets we endorse.

2. Representations come before policy-focus

**Russell 9** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

A critical reading of this debate suggests that setting priorities for health care is a discursive process (that is, it involves argument and debate). The policy-as-discourse perspective embraces a number of approaches that are centrally concerned with how policy problems are represented. **Policymakers are not simply responding to "problems"** that exist in the community, **they are actively framing problems and thereby shaping what can be thought about and acted upon.** According to Stone (1988): "The essence of policymaking in political communities [is] the struggle over ideas. Ideas are at the centre of all political conflict .... Each idea is an argument, or more accurately, a collection of arguments in favour of different ways of seeing the world" (p. 11). Within this conceptualization of policymaking, the understanding of "what evidence is" takes on a very different meaning. Evidence can no longer be considered as abstract, disembodied knowledge separate from its social context: There is no such entity as "the body of evidence." There are simply (more or less) competing (re)constructions of evidence able to support almost any position. Much of what is called evidence is, in fact, a contested domain, constituted in the debates and controversies of opposing viewpoints in search of ever more compelling arguments. (Wood, Ferlie, and Fitzgerald 1998, p. 1735) A number of empirical studies of health policy as discourse have been undertaken, though in general, these are not well understood or widely cited in mainstream health services research. Steve Maguire (2002), for example, describes a longitudinal case study of the development and introduction of drugs for the treatment of AIDS in the United States from 1981 to 1994. Detailed analysis of extensive field notes and narrative interviews with people with AIDS, activists, researchers, industry executives, and policymakers led his team to challenge three assumptions in the evidence-into-policy literature: (1) that there is a clear distinction between the "evidence producing" system and the "evidence adopting" system; (2) that the structure and operation of these systems are given, stable, and determinant of, rather than indeterminate and affected by, the adoption process; and (3) that the production of evidence precedes its adoption. Maguire's study found the opposite: that there was a fluid, dynamic, and reciprocal relationship between the different systems involved, and that activists "successfully opened up the black box of science" via a vibrant social movement which, over the course of the study, profoundly influenced the research agenda and the process and speed of gaining official approval for new drugs. For example, whereas the scientific community had traditionally set the gold standard as placebo controlled trials with hard outcome measures (such as death), the AIDS activists successfully persuaded them that placebo arms and "body count" trials were unethical in AIDS research, spurring a shift towards what is now standard practice in drug research--a new drug is compared with best conventional treatment, not placebo, and "surrogate outcomes" are generally preferred when researching potentially lethal conditions. **The role of key individuals in reframing the issue** ("hard outcomes" or "body counts") **was crucial in determining what counted as best evidence and how this evidence was used in policymaking.** Importantly, Maguire's fieldwork showed that AIDS activists did not simply "talk their way in" to key decision-making circles by some claim to an inherent version of what was true or right. Rather, they captured, and skillfully built upon, existing discourses within society, such as the emerging patients' rights movement and the epistemological debates already being held within the academic community that questioned the value of "clean" research trials (which only included "typical" and "compliant" patients without co-morbidity). They also collaborated strategically with a range of other stakeholders to achieve a common goal ("strange bedfellows ... pharmaceutical companies along with the libertarian, conservative right wing allied themselves with people with AIDS and gays" (p. 85). Once key individuals in the AIDS movement had established themselves as credible with press, public, and scientists, they could exploit this credibility powerfully: "their public comments on which trials made sense or which medications were promising could sink research projects" (p. 85). "Fair" Policymaking: A Process of Argumentation In summary, interpretivist and critical research on the nature of policymaking shows that it involves, in addition to the identification, evaluation, and use of research evidence, a complex process of framing, deliberation, negotiation, and collective judgment. Empirical research studies also suggest that this is a sophisticated and challenging process. In a qualitative research study of priority-setting committees in Ontario, for example, Singer and colleagues (2000) identified factors such as representation of multiple perspectives, opportunities for everyone to express views, transparency, and an explicit appeals process as key elements of fair decision making. An important dimension of this collective deliberation is the selection and presentation of evidence in a way that an audience will find credible and appealing. **If we wish to better understand** the deliberative processes involved in **policymaking,** and how evidence actually gets "talked into practice" (or not) at a micro level of social interaction, then **we require a** theoretical **framework that places central focus on** language, argumentation, and **discourse.**

### Ks Good

Ks are core neg strat because they check back unpredictable affs. I need Ks that can mitigate aff offense because the aff chooses the area debate and thus will always have more specific substantive research.

Postmodern education is lifelong learning; it’s the best form of education if I win the substance of the kritik

**Edwards and Usher 1** write[[13]](#footnote-13)

It is sometimes suggested that lifelong learning is not a new concept, and indeed, there is some truth to this. However, we, like others (Wain, 2000), feel that earlier discourses had more of a focus on lifelong education than lifelong learning and that the shift toward a concern with encouraging individuals to become lifelong learners is part of a wider shift whereby governments empower their populations to become active citizens and to become more responsible for their own life courses (Dean, 1999; Field, 2000). Under the sign of lifelong learning, institutionalized education at all levels is becoming increasingly more diverse in terms of goals, processes, organizational structures, curricula, and pedagogy. This both reflects and contributes to a breakdown and reinscription in different forms of clear and settled demarcations between different sectors of education and between education and the life world. Lifelong learning is a manifestation of and contributor to this dedifferation and redifferentiation, now increasingly seen as goals to be pursued by education across the board rather than by a specific sector or through a particular curriculum. This spreading epidemic of lifelong learning has meant that **institutional**ized **education can no longer claim a monopoly over knowledge production** and assessment on the grounds that it is a formally constituted field or through its role in epistemological policing. Both its authority and power are subject to question. Once learning starts to become recognized as located in a variety and diversity of social practices **outside the institutional, a greater multiplicity of activities** is seen as involving learning and hence **can be deemed educational.** What this implies is that **lifelong learning** is not simply a term for a policy or mode of provision. In addition, and perhaps more important, it can be understood as a metaphor that **brings to the fore the boundlessness of learning;** that is, **it is not to be confined by** predetermined outcomes, **formal institutions, and epistemological control**. The metaphor “lifelong learning” alerts us to a way of seeing learning as without boundaries. Simultaneously, we want to argue that this way of seeing brings out its postmodern condition. The various phenomena subsumable under the heading lifelong learning, located in different discourses and played out through different social practices, signify **learning** that could be inside or outside educational institutions and that **is not necessarily bounded by what educators** would **traditionally define as** the transmission of“appropriate” and/or **“worthwhile” knowledge.** As such, we want to suggest, echoing Lyotard’s (1984) argument regarding a postmodern condition of knowledge, that **lifelong learning can be viewed as a postmodern condition of education**, where this implies a diversity of practices and also an enfolding with modernist educational practices. We therefore have sympathy, although do not entirely agree, with Wain’s (2000) assertion that “we have moved, or are fast moving into a new postmodern discourse or language game from which the word ‘education’ is itself being gradually eased out in favour of lifelong learning and performativity” (p. 37). Wain sees this as a point of exit from the discourse of the modern, whereas we take the modern and postmodern to be complexly layered and enfolded.

Education outweighs fairness. It’s an out-of-round impact but fairness is an in-round impact.

Postmodern education is key to fairness because epistemic suspicion is key to including people who are otherwise excluded from expert discourses, that’s Seidman 94.

Ground. Living wage is aff-biased. I need kritiks like this one to check that back.

Wiki solves predictability. I’ve read this before.

The K impact turns theory. Theory interps are meta-narratives that assume an extra-discursive reality; we must recognize that debate doesn’t really have rules since it’s all subject to our language games.

K outweighs theory. You won’t deter me from running the K, but you can challenge hegemonic forms of knowledge production in this round

### Poverty Turn

**MLK’s not an empirical authority. At best they win that we should trust MLK that poverty is bad, but not MLK’s reasoning that a living wage solves it, so poverty turns and outweighs case.**

**Living wage causes poverty; consensus of economists**

**Quigley 1**

William Quigley, Law Professor-Loyola University New Orleans, 2001, "Full Time Workers Should Not Be Poor: The Living Wage Movement," Mississippi Law Journal, Spring, 70 Miss. J.J. 889, p. 935-6

Opponents of living wages argue that these ordinances could potentially increase the local poverty rate and cost too much. A survey of over 300 economists conducted in 2000 for the Employment Policies Institute, a nonprofit research organization generally opposed to raises in both the minimum wage and the enactment of living wage ordinances, found that nearly eight in ten of the labor economists surveyed thought living wage ordinances would result in employers hiring higher skilled workers, and over 70% said the laws could potentially reduce the number of entry-level jobs and thus increase the local poverty rate. [n180](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n180) The opposition also suggests that living wage ordinances increase the cost of governmental contracts. Pasadena, California, estimated their living wage ordinance cost to be about $ 200,000 for the year 2000; Cambridge, Massachusetts, estimated its cost at $ 300,000; Madison, Wisconsin, estimated its cost at $ 47,000. [n181](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n181) While there is certainly some cost associated with living wages, this article will not join in the aforementioned melee of economists. Others disagree. [n182](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n182)

### Free Markets Turn

A living wage is government interference in the free market

**Phillips 13** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

The focus on wages reverses cause and effect. The focus on wages is a focus on consumption—what a worker can buy from his wages. But an individual cannot consume until he produces, unless he wishes to live as a parasite. Government intervention impedes production. Government intervention prevents individuals from starting businesses, creating jobs, developing new products or processes. **Government intervention prevents individuals from acting on their own judgment**. If someone wants to offer a job with a pay of $2 an hour, he should be free to do so. If he cannot attract enough workers at that wage, he will need to offer more or go out of business. If a worker is willing to work for $2 an hour, why should anyone prevent him from doing so? **If the business owner judges that a job is only worth $2 an hour, he should be free to act** on his own judgment**. If a worker judges that** a job paying **$2 an hour is his best opportunity, he should be free to act** on his own judgment. Government intervention in the employer/employee relationship prohibits each from acting as he thinks best for his own life. Like all advocates of government intervention, the **advocates of a “living wage” believe that they know what is best for other** individual**s. They are willing to use government coercion to dictate** how others may live **their lives**. Ironically, and sadly, while advocating a “living wage” they simultaneously seek to prohibit others from actually living.

The rich are comparatively better moral authorities

**Mohanty 12** writes[[15]](#footnote-15)

Do we exalt the John Galts and Howard Roarks among us or despise them? Do we admire the ultimate, self-centered and selfish capitalists or the selfless, self-sacrificing altruists? Oh **sure there are** the **M**artin **L**uther **K**ing, Jr.**s and** Mahatma **Gandhis and** Nelson **Mandelas** and Aung Sun Suu Kyis **we like to point to as** icons and **worthy role models** for our children. **But look deeply and** we find that **we are obsessed with the wealthy**. And who are the wealthy? Why do **we let** the Robert Rubins, Sandy Weills, Jakc Welchs, Jamie Dimons and their **Wall St. brethren keep their millions**? **Because we consider that** right and **their right**. Let alone the hedge fund people whose entire purpose is to become billionaires. How many people explicitly make life choices that will lead to a life of service -> not be a charlatan like Mother Teresa but just helping the underprivileged without trying to 'achieve' greatness by so doing. So Lance Armstrong and Greg Mortensen and the Evangelical Christian blowhards such as Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell don't count. All the Indian Hindu godmen -- who are too numerous to make a comprehensive list -- are in it to become gods themselves. I hope nobody thinks for a moment that a Sai Baba or Ravi Shankar or Ram dev or the others are in it to do 'service.' Think of the obsessive listing of the wealthy in the media -> what does that show except that We The People are obsessed with wealth and the wealthy. Think of the self-promotional crazy stunts of the Hollywood celebrities who are clearly not in the business of doing charity by any stretch of the imagination. Coming down from these Olympian levels to levels of ordinary mortals like you and me, what motivates the average successful individual?  Take a doctor. There are hundreds of thousands if not millions of doctors in the world. Who goes to the top of that pyramid? There are only a few doctors who reach the top of their chosen profession of medicine - they are the top dogs, the chairmen of depts. at academic medical centers, the consultants to the big pharma companies, the rock stars of the various medical disciplines like cancer or heart or brain surgery, the doctors who have built enough of  a name for themselves that the average public has heard of them. These are the doctors who manage to make in excess of a million dollars in the U.S. Take teachers. There are thousands and hundreds of thousands of them. But only a few reach the top of this mountain. The teachers who are professors at the Ivy League universities, who write books, or appear on TV, or go on the lecture circuit, perhaps serve in the govt. for a while, head think tanks -> think Condolezza Rice and Elizabeth Warren or Michael Sandel and Niall Ferguson. Take sportspersons. Is it even POSSIBLE to think of top sportspersons separately from their multi-million endorsement deals? Who is the exception? Not Tiger Woods. Neither Roger Federer nor Michael Schumacher. And surely not David Beckham. You can add any famous footballer, or basketball player or tennis player or baseball player or Formula One driver or boxer. They do it for the money. The 'closest' way to be a follower of the Dr. Kings and Gandhis would be to enter public service. How many leaders on the world stage can you name who are in public service primarily to do selfless service? At worst, elected leaders of nations can turn into Hitlers. But even at their best, democratic nations have produced leaders like George W. Bush or Tony Blair. Indian democracy seems to be faithful not to a republican ideal but to some older, apparently ingrained desire to elect leaders belonging to the same family generation after generation. All democracies appear to be flawed to various degrees. And yet, these are the 'democracies.' Nobody expects Iran, North Korea, or Cuba, or Venezuela to come up with the next Gandhi. Leaders of nations never fail to extol the 'courage' and 'sacrifice' of the troops belonging to their nations. So Obama will say that America's fighting forces are the best and finest forces in the world and the men and women 'serving' in those forces make incredible 'sacrifices' for their country everyday. The French President will say the same about the French soldiers. The Indian Prime Minister will say the same things as well -> about bravery and courage and sacrifice. I think we all understand the lie in this and let it be. The troops are not in the military because they want to make sacrifices for their country but because of other personal factors -> may be they wanted to be fighter pilots or be at the cutting edge of technology or they come from poor families and the military seemed a nice enough career option from a financial perspective. The Obama and Democratic doctrine in the U.S. of sturdier social safety nets and a move towards universal healthcare and greater government role in providing various services to the citizens finds favor with the citizens precisely because there are so many millions of people who are dependent on these services and safety nets. If I am a Medicare beneficiary and fight to continue to be one and want to vote and vote for the guy who'll assure me that it ain't going anywhere, then I am not doing anything altruistic, am I? Even women appear to have realized that they will have greater power over men by 'withholding' the only currency they have -> that of sex. So from a peak of a permissive and pervasive culture of sex, we see women retreating towards some ideal of monogamy - or at at least giving importance to traditional social structures such as marriage (followed by monogamy). Perhaps **nothing exemplifies** the fundamental self-centeredness and **selfishness** of human beings **as the fact of** there being such **income disparities** within and among nations on one planet. We have not really learned that we are one species, have we? We are still Americans and Canadians and French and British and Germans and Russians and Japanese. Oh, these are merely the rich folks of the world. The advanced, wealthy nations of the world at best have a total combined population of one billion. The rest of the global population (six billion plus) is poor. Even within these rich countries, the poor are taken care of to varying degrees - in the Scandinavian nations, or in Japan, a sense of equity and inclusiveness exists; the poor are taken care of by the government, the old receive free medical care or pensions. In America, people are less entitled to government stuff - though there's Medicare and Medicaid, there's no national government-funded and government-run healthcare system. But beyond these tiny islands of wealth and the even tinier islands of wealth in the Middle East, there exist these vast oceans of povery across much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Millions of people existing on the edge of starvation and death. If humans were not selfish, with all the knowledge and technology at our disposal, people in the developed nations would have pushed their governments to do more to eradicate some of the completely unnecessary deaths from easily curable diseases that is still so commonplace in so many parts of the world. Are you thinking -> "Well, why would the average American or Canadian or French citizen think about grinding poverty in Africa and India?" Well, exactly. They don't. They are too busy with their own lives. Which explains why we see so much coverage in the media about the challenges of bringing up kids in the age of Ritalin and Facebook. We see coverage about homes that cost a million dollars and other homes that cost 50 or 100 million dollars. And cars that cost 100,000 dollars to a million dollars. We have the ridiculous state of affairs where people in the developed nations spend more on their pets than people in developing countries spend on their human babies. Which is why we have medicines for cancer that can cost 5,000 dollars per month - clearly out of reach for the billions who survive on less than a dollar a day. **Here's the contradiction people are living with** consciously or unconsciously. The average middle class person in the U.S. or Europe doesn't consider himself or herself to be a 'parasite' as Ayn Rand might. So **it's considered right** and correct **that the rich should** be asked to **pay their fair share of taxes** to the government **and the government should take care of the poor**, the elderly and those who are not able to fend for themselves. **At the same time, there's no law against becoming millionaires** or billionaires -> becoming wealthy is mostly celebrated. Making money is mostly a glorious activity and achievement in the rich societies. **So, people are in agreement with** Ayn **Rand when she says that the wealthy are the heroes and that free market economics is** the **right** policy choice. But people don't agree with Rand when she considers the poor to be 'parasites.' People are ok with government helping those who have fallen on hard times. Indeed, people want the government to do more -> particularly as more and more people are becoming prone to falling and indeed falling into hard times. The veterans, the elderly, the poor, the unemployed, etc. do not consider themselves to be parasites. The problem with this conception and formulation of a 'compassionate society' is that the compassion stops at the border. It's not clear why that should be so -- particularly in this age of the ubiquitous internet when the sufferings of anyone and everyone in the world living anywhere is instantaneously transmitted to every corner of the world by TV. Why is the suffering of the homeless kids in Florida more heart-wrenching than the suffering of the kids in Africa or Afghanistan or the suffering of the street kids in India. Why is it news if 'adult' children in the U.S. are 'moving in' with their parents because of the challenging economic environment? Are not there more challenging crises facing humans in poor countries of the world? What about the urban poor in India and China who live in very difficult circumstances -- perhaps in slums? The average middle class person in the West earning 30,000 dollars per annum would be virtually a millionaire in poor India or Africa. But the middle class folks in the rich nations don't feel that they have a 'duty' to be compassionate towards the poor and the suffering citizens and kids throughout the world. The **governments in** the **rich nations do not feel obliged to tax the middle class** heavily **and send the revenue** collected **to** the **poor nations. So** the **compassion** of the average American or European **extends** to the unfortunate citizen or kid **only within** the boundaries of **their own country**. A wonderful case of moral relativism indeed. Or **simple selfishness showing in the end that people operate in their minds in the way that** Ayn **Rand portrayed** -> though people may be ashamed to admit that in the exaggerated way in which Rand contrasts the 'heroes' and 'parasites' in her novels.

# Util 1NC

## Off Case

### Util Framework

Revisionary intuitionism is true and leads to util.

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my **meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless.** And this appears to be a general syndrome - **people do much better when discussing whether torture is** good or **bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level** wherever I possibly can. Occasionally **people object** to any discussion of morality on the grounds **that morality doesn't exist**, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that **"exist" is not the right term to use** here, I generally say, "But **what do you do anyway?**" and **take the discussion back down to the object level.** Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. **I see** the project of **morality as a project of renormalizing intuition.** We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. **Delete all** the **intuitions, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, **you're left with a rock. Keep all your** specific **intuitions and** refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, **you're left with a** grunting **caveperson** running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. **Even modus ponens is an "intuition"** in this sense - **it**'s **just** that modus ponens **still seems like a good idea after being** formalized, **reflected on**, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, **if you try to violate** "**util**itarianism", **you run into paradoxes, contradictions**, circular preferences, **and other** things that aren't **symptoms of** moral wrongness so much as **moral incoherence.** After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. **After** the two hundred and eighty-seventh **research** study **showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity** - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, **people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives**... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, **you could** look at this intuition, and **think it was** revealing **some** kind of **incredibly deep moral truth** which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? **Or you could** look at that and **say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't** successfully **multiply** by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. **But it ought to**, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. **When you've read enough** heuristics and **biases research, and enough coherence** and uniqueness **proofs for** Bayesian probabilities and **expected utility**, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, **then you don't see** the **preference reversals** in the Allais Paradox **as** revealing **some** incredibly **deep moral truth** about the intrinsic value of certainty. **It just goes to show that the brain doesn't** goddamn **multiply.** The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that **primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of** symbols standing for **small quantities** - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. **When you've reflected** on enough intuitions, **and corrected enough absurdities, you** start to **see a common denominator, a meta-principle** at work, **which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply."** Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. **And that's why I'm a utilitarian** - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

Consequentialist theories provide the simplest explanation of rational decision-making

**Pettit 99** writes[[17]](#footnote-17)

There are at least three respects in which **consequentialism scores on simplicity**. The first is that whereas consequentialists endorse only one way of responding to values, non-consequentialists endorse two. **Non-consequentialists** all **commit** themselves **to the view that certain values should be honoured rather than promoted**: say, values like those associated with loyalty and respect. **But they** all **agree**, whether or not in their role as moral theorists, that **certain** other **values should be promoted**: values **as various as economic prosperity, personal hygiene, and** the **safety of nuclear installations**. Thus **where consequentialists introduce a single axiom on how values justify choices, non-consequentialists must introduce two.** But not only is non-consequentialism less simple for losing the numbers game. It is also less simple for playing the game in an ad hoc way. Non-consequentialists all identify certain values as suitable for honouring rather than promoting. But they do not generally explain what it is about the values identified which means that justification comes from their being honoured rather than promoted. And indeed it is not clear what satisfactory explanation can be provided. **It is one thing to make a list of** the **values which allegedly require honouring**: values, say, like personal loyalty, respect for others, and punishment for wrongdoing. **It is another to say why these values are so** very **different from** the **ordinary** run of **desirable properties**. There may be features that mark them off from other values, but why do those features matter so much? That question typically goes unconsidered by non-consequentialists. Not only do they have a duality then where consequentialists have a unity; **they** also **have an unexplained duality**. The third respect in which **consequentialism** scores on the simplicity count is that it **fits nicely with** our **standard views of** what **rationality** requires, whereas non-consequentialism is in tension with such views. The agent concerned with a value is in a parallel position to that of an agent concerned with some personal good: say, health or income or status. In thinking about how an agent should act on the concern for a personal good, **we unhesitatingly say that** of course **the rational thing to do**, the rationally justified action, **is to act so that the good is promoted**. That means then that whereas the consequentialist line on how values justify choices is continuous with the standard line on rationality in the pursuit of personal goods, the non-consequentialist line is not. **The non-consequentialist has the embarrassment of having to defend a position** on what certain values require which is **without analogue in** the **non-moral** area of **practical rationality.**

### Outsourcing DA

Minimum wage increase leads to higher prices for the poor and causes outsourcing which kills US economic competitiveness.

**Leong 13** writes[[18]](#footnote-18)

The real problem is that other **low**er**-wage**-paying **companies**, such as McDonalds Corporation (NYSE/MCD), simply **won’t absorb** wage **increases without passing the increase** on **to** their **customers**. And there’s absolutely nothing illegal in this. It’s a fact: an increase in wages equals an increase in the price of goods. Think of it this way: when a company is forced to pay its minimum-wage employees a higher wage, **the company needs to allocate more** money **to**ward **payroll**. With an increase in wage costs, **that company now needs to find a** new **way to increase earnings so that it can cover this increase**. Raising the price of its goods is an obvious answer for the company. For instance, the cost of a $3.00 “Big Mac” rises to $3.25 following an increase in minimum wage. By boosting the minimum wage, the **low**er**-wage earners may make more, but it will be partly offset by higher costs for** end **goods**, such as those **at Wal-Mart and McDonald’s**, **which** are stores the **lower-income earners may be more inclined to shop** or eat **at**. Moreover, increasing the minimum wage will mean higher input costs at manufacturing plants across the nation. These **manufacturing plants will** then have two options: 1) **raise the price** of the end product; **or** 2) **move** part or all of their **manufacturing to cheaper labor markets** in places like Asia and Latin America. I suspect some companies will look more seriously at the latter option; and we all know **China and Mexico would welcome $2.00-per-hour plant jobs**. So before we just implement higher wages, we need to put more thought into the process; we need to consider what detrimental affects **higher wages** could have on America’s economy and its position in the broader economy, as a wage increase **could easily hurt** the **competitiveness of the country in the global market.**

Empirics prove that competitiveness creates economic hegemony which solves global conflict. **Hubbard 10** writes[[19]](#footnote-19)

Research into the theoretical underpinnings of this topic revealed that there are two main subfields within the literature on hegemonic stability. One line of study, an avenue pursued by prominent theorists such as Kindleberger, Keohane, and Ikenberry focuses primarily on questions of related to the economic system. The other avenue, pursued by theorists such as Gilpin, looks at the role of hegemonic governance in reducing violent conflict. In my research, I focus on this aspect of hegemonic stability – its implications for military conflict in the international system. To research this question, I undertook a broad quantitative study that examined data from both the American and British hegemonic epochs, focusing on the years of 1815-1939 in the case of British hegemony, and 1945 to 1999 in the case of American hegemony. I hypothesized that hegemonic strength was inversely correlated with levels of armed conflict in the international system. Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the Composite Index of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. **I** then **matched this data with data cataloging all conflicts** in the international system **since 1815**. I organized this data into five-year increments, in order to make statistical analysis more feasible. **Regression** analysis of the data **revealed** that there was **a statistically significant negative correlation between** relative **heg**emonic power **and conflict** levels in the international system. However, further statistical tests added complications to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. Regression analysis of military actions engaged in by the hegemon versus total conflict in the system revealed a highly positive correlation for both American and British hegemony. Further **analysis revealed** that in both cases, **military power was a less accurate predictor of** military **conflict than economic power**. There are several possible explanations for these findings. It is likely that economic stability has an effect on international security. In addition, **weaker hegemons are more likely to be challenged militarily** than stronger hegemons. Thus, the hegemon will engage in more conflicts during times of international insecurity, because such times are also when the hegemon is weakest. Perhaps the **most important** implication of this research **is that hegemons may well be more effective in promoting peace through economic power** than through the exercise of military force. II. Research Question In examining hegemonic stability theory, there are several important questions to consider. First of all, an acceptable definition of what constitutes a hegemon must be established. Secondly, a good measure of what constitutes stability in the international system must be determined. Certainly, the frequency and severity of interstate conflict is an important measure of stability in the international system. However, other measures of stability should also be taken into account. Conflict in the international system takes on a wide range of forms. While military conflict is perhaps the most violent and severe dimension, it is only one of many forms that conflict can take. Conflict need not be confined to wars between traditional states. Terrorism, piracy, and guerilla warfare are also types of conflict that are endemic to the international system. Economic conflict, exemplified by trade wars, hostile actions such as sanctions, or outright trade embargos, is also an important form of conflict in the international system. States can also engage in a range of less severe actions that might be deemed political conflict, by recalling an ambassador or withdrawing from international bodies, for example. Clearly, “stability” as it pertains to the international system is a vast and amorphous concept. Because of these complexities, a comprehensive assessment of the theory is beyond the purview of this research. However, completing a more focused analysis is a realistic endeavor. Focusing on international armed conflicts in two select periods will serve to increase the feasibility the research. I will focus on the period of British hegemony lasting from the end of the Napoleonic wars to 1939 and the period of American hegemony beginning after the Second World War and continuing until 1999, the last year for which reliable data is available. The proposed hypothesis is that in these periods, the **heg**emon **acted as a stabilizing force** by reducing the frequency and severity of international armed conflict. The dependent variable in this case is the frequency and severity of conflict. The primary independent variable is the power level of the hegemon. This hypothesis is probabilistic since it posits that the hegemon tended to reduce conflict, not that it did so in every single possible instance. One way to test this hypothesis would be through a case-study method that examined the role of Britain and the United States in several different conflicts. This method would have the advantage of approaching the problem from a very feasible, limited perspective. While it would not reveal much about hegemony on a broader theoretical level, it would help provide practical grounding for what is a highly theoretical area of stuffy in international relations. Another method would be to do a broader quantitative comparison of international conflict by finding and comparing data on conflict and hegemonic strength for the entire time covered by British and American hegemony. The hypothesis is falsifiable, because it could be shown that the hegemon did not act as a stabilizing force during the years of study. **It** also **avoids** some of **the pitfalls** associated **with the case study method, such as selection bias and** the inherently **subjective** nature of **qualitative analysis.**

Absent heg, these conflicts will escalate and cause extinction. **Kagan 7** writes[[20]](#footnote-20)

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. **Nationalism** in all its forms **is back**, if it ever went away, **and so is international competition for power**, influence, honor, and status. **American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying** — its regional as well as its global predominance. **Were the U**nited **S**tates **to diminish its influence** in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the **other nations would settle disputes** as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often **through confrontation and wars** of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that **most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons.** **That could make wars** between them less likely, or it could simply make them more **catastrophic.**

Adopt a parliamentary model to account for moral uncertainty. This entails minimizing existential risks. **Bostrom 9** writes[[21]](#footnote-21)

It seems people are overconfident about their moral beliefs.  But **how should one** reason and **act if one** acknowledges that one **is uncertain about morality** – not just applied ethics but fundamental moral issues? if you don't know which moral theory is correct?

It doesn't seem **you can[’t] simply plug your uncertainty into expected utility** decision theory and crank the wheel; **because many** moral **theories** state that you **should not** always **maximize** expected **utility.**

Even if we limit consideration to consequentialist theories, it still is hard to see how to combine them in the standard decision theoretic framework.  For example, suppose you give X% probability to total utilitarianism and (100-X)% to average utilitarianism.  Now an action might add 5 utils to total happiness and decrease average happiness by 2 utils.  (This could happen, e.g. if you create a new happy person that is less happy than the people who already existed.)  Now what do you do, for different values of X?

The problem gets even more complicated if we consider not only consequentialist theories but also deontological theories, contractarian theories, virtue ethics, etc.  We might even throw various meta-ethical theories into the stew: error theory, relativism, etc.

I'm working on a paper on this together with my colleague Toby Ord.  We have some arguments against a few possible "solutions" that we think don't work.  On the positive side we have some tricks that work for a few special cases.  But beyond that, the best **we have managed** so far is **a** kind of **metaphor, which** we don't think is literally and exactly correct, and it is a bit under-determined, but it **seems to get things roughly right** and it might point in the right direction:

**The Parliamentary Model.**  Suppose that you have a set of mutually exclusive moral theories, and that you assign each of these some probability.  Now imagine that **each** of these **theorie**s **gets to send** some number of **delegates to The Parliament**.  The number of delegates each theory gets to send is **proportional to the probability of the theory.**  Then the delegates bargain with one another for support on various issues; and the Parliament reaches a decision by the delegates voting.  What you should do is act according to the decisions of this imaginary Parliament.  (Actually, we use an extra trick here: we imagine that the delegates act as if the Parliament's decision were a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A.  This has the effect of eliminating the artificial 50% threshold that otherwise gives a majority bloc absolute power.  Yet – unbeknownst to the delegates – the Parliament always takes whatever action got the most votes: this way we avoid paying the cost of the randomization!)

The idea here is that moral theories get more influence the more probable they are; yet **even a** relatively **weak theory can still get its way on some issues** that the theory think are extremely important **by sacrificing** its influence **on other** i**s**sues that other theories deem more important.  For example, **suppose you assign 10% probability to** total **util**itarianism and 90% to moral egoism (just to illustrate the principle).  Then **the Parliament** would mostly take actions that maximize egoistic satisfaction; however it **would make some concessions to util**itarianism **on** issues that utilitarianism thinks is especially important.  In this example, the person might donate some portion of their income to **existential risks** research and otherwise live completely selfishly.

I think there might be wisdom in **this model**.  It **avoids the** dangerous and **unstable extremism** that would result **from letting one’s current favorite moral theory completely dictate action**, while still allowing the aggressive pursuit of some non-commonsensical high-leverage strategies so long as they don’t infringe too much on what other major moral theories deem centrally important.

## Case

### General Answers

1. The standard fails for rational decision-making since we don’t know of every single moral authority, what each one of them believes about everything, and how they relate to our lives. Consequentialism solves since it’s inspired by the average practical rationality of a person, that’s Pettit 99.

2. Moral authorities could contradict. Even if moral authorities are recognized by our intuitions, intuitions also conflict. We need revisionary intuitionism to resolve those conflicts because if intuitions conflict, one of them is inevitably the un-founded one. Revisionary intuitionism means util, that’s Yudkowsky 8.

3. There are lots of horrible traditions like infanticide and female genital mutilation. His framework justifies acceptance of those.

### Gadamer Bad

Upholding tradition promotes authoritarian and dogmatic forms of thought. Critical self-reflection that calls tradition into question is essential to freedom.

**Kim 11** summarizes Habermas[[22]](#footnote-22)

This early work anticipates aspects of his later theory insofar as it ties together the empirical and the transcendental (Habermas, 1986a:197). As we saw in Section 4.3 universal pragmatics has a similar structure: everyday language (the empirical) and a counterfactually presupposed set of validity claims (the ‘transcendental’). The concept of knowledge-constitutive interests are, in Habermas’s language, ‘quasi-transcendental’ (Held, 1980:255). The three knowledgeconstitutive interests correspond to three domains of social life: labour (empirical-analytical), language (historical-hermeneutic), and what might be more vaguely described as ‘emancipation’ (critical reflection). This third domain – **critical reflection** – is articulated as **the emancipatory interest in overcoming authoritarian and dogmatic structures of thought** and action (Held, 1980:255). Since this is central to Habermas’s critique of Gadamer I will focus on it here. Essentially, it may be stated that critical reflection has the aim of recreating a 104completely uninhibited subjectivity. Habermas states that, ‘this interest can only develop to the degree to which repressive force, in the form of the normative exercise of power, presents itself permanently in structures of distorted communication – that is to the extent that domination is institutionalised’ (Habermas, 1973b:9). Habermas links the emancipatory interest to critical reflection and argues that **critical reflection not only unveils** the **concealed ‘structures of distortion’, but dissolves** the **‘effects of distortion’** (Sinclair, 2005:230). Hence Habermas endorses the importance of the emancipatory characteristic of critical reflection as follows: The experience of reflection articulates itself substantially in the concept of a selfformative process. Methodologically it leads to a standpoint from which the identity of reason with the will of reason freely arises. In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in autonomy and responsibility. For the **pursuit of reflection knows itself as a movement of emancipation. Reason is at the same time subject to** the **interest in reason**. We can say that it obeys an emancipatory cognitive interest which aims at the pursuit of reflection. (Habermas, 1982:198) Habermas asserts that epistemology is only possible as social theory; moreover, critique is viable only in instances where ‘reason is at the same time subject to the interest in reason’ (Habermas, 1973b:198). In other words, reason that is not tied to human interests – or awareness of human interests – cannot serve the end of emancipation. In his later work this is expressed in the idea of communicative reason, as distinct from strategic reason: in becoming aware that we raise validity claims we also become aware of the emancipatory potential of reason. Habermas further maintains that ‘the hypothetical construct which I will call knowledge-constitutive or knowledge-guiding interest is supposed to enable us to understand the systematic (though conditional) embeddedness of discursively produced theoretical knowledge in the practice of a form of life which can only reproduce itself with the aid of potentially true statements’ (Habermas, 1973a:180-181). To explain: there is a mutual entanglement of truth and social life. Scientific practices are embedded in social life, but society must be guided by the pursuit of truth. Habermas is not, of course, concerned exclusively with Gadamer, but his notion of **‘critical self-reflection’**, tied to knowledge-constitutive interests, **is central to** his **critique of Gadamer**ian hermeneutics. So what exactly is ‘critical self-reflection’? Habermas refers to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit by suggesting that it is ‘the critical dissolution of subjectively constituted pseudo-objectivity’ whereby, **through gaining** an **understanding of** the 105**delusions of ‘false consciousness’,** an individual is able to ‘emancipate itself from itself’ (Habermas, 1973a:182-183). **Critical self-reflection is** then the **dissolution of historically produced reifications of consciousness, which is precisely what** Habermas thinks **Gadamer is engaged in through** his **positive evaluation of tradition**, and the prejudices that underlie tradition. The only way that such reifications can be dissolved is through communicative action, although Habermas only gradually formulated a theory that embodied the emancipatory potential of language.

Gadamer’s defense of tradition conflates understanding with interpretation and precludes social criticism when we have a good idea that tradition isn’t always correct

**Kim 11** summarizes Habermas[[23]](#footnote-23)

In Habermas’s view **Gadamer adopts a perspective on tradition** and language **which places too much weight on empirical agreement**, as distinct from ‘coming to an understanding’ from a standpoint of equality. Furthermore, **‘understanding’ and ‘interpretation’ are**, Habermas suggests, **analytically distinct, but Gadamer fails to** explain or even **acknowledge this fact** (Holub, 1991:46). Subsequently, there is present **in Gadamer’s work** an uncritical ‘nostalgia’ and **the concept of ‘understanding’ is so hermeneutically rooted that social criticism is impossible** (Kaplan, 2003:41). Gadamer, in effect, reifies social life, viewing tradition as an ‘objective’ context (Habermas, 1986b:313). The relation that Gadamer posits between understanding and prejudice, authority, and tradition is characterised by the assimilation and preservation of conventional and existing norms: ‘Gadamer, if I am correct, is of the opinion that the hermeneutical elucidation of unintelligible or misunderstood expression must refer back to a prior consensus which has been reliably worked out in the dialogue of a convergent tradition.’ (Habermas, 1986b:313). With this in mind, it is clear that Habermas links Gadamer with traditional hermeneutics, which saw its task as the avoidance of misunderstanding. Tradition is thus considered to be ‘objective for us, in the sense that it cannot be confronted with a claim to truth in principle’ (Habermas, 1986b:313). **As a result of the account of** the inherently prejudiced character of all **understanding provided by Gadamer, it is not only impractical to question** the **consensus** around tradition **but also pointless** (Habermas, 1986b:313). In Habermas’ view, Gadamer has ‘further used hermeneutical insight into the prejudicial structure of understanding to restrict the quest for enlightenment to the horizon of prevailing convictions’ (Habermas, 1986b:316): **We have good reason to suspect that** the **background consensus of established traditions** and language games **can be a consciousness forged of compulsions**, a result of pseudo-communication, not only in the pathologically isolated case of disturbed familial systems, but in entire social systems as well. The **freedom of movement of a hermeneutical understanding** widened into critique, **therefore, ought not to be linked to** the free play available within the tradition and **prevailing convictions**. (Habermas, 1986b:317)

Gadamer can’t have it both ways. Either Varun’s framework precludes social criticism or tradition isn’t the foundation of subjectivity

**Kim 11** summarizes Habermas[[24]](#footnote-24)

Habermas further argues that ‘the objectivity of a “happening” of tradition that is made up of symbolic meaning is not objective enough. Hermeneutics comes up against the walls of the traditional framework from the inside, as it were’ (Habermas, 1977:360). In other words, **Gadamer cannot simultaneously reject the traditional positivist**, objectivist **view** of human life, **and at the same time** **treat tradition as something that ‘exists’** (that ‘happens’). Of course, Habermas also rejects the positivist conception of society, but he would argue that he is better armed in his confrontation with the objectifying natural sciences. Against tradition-validating hermeneutics **Habermas maintains that sociology requires a ‘reference system’ which will ‘**no longer leave tradition as such in its relation to other aspects of the complex of social life, thereby **enabl**ing **us to designate** the **conditions outside of tradition under which transcendental rules of** world-comprehension and of **action empirically change’** (Habermas, 1977:361). **That ‘reference system’** – which communicative action theory provides – **places tradition under criticism**. In effect, the ‘walls of the traditional framework’ referred to above are broken through. **Gadamer does not allow for the possibility that when reflecting** up**on tradition that ‘tradition’ might be changed and** – this is the crucial point – **if** it is **changed** then it **does not have the power to** affect or **determine subjectivity** (Habermas, 1977:354). Gadamer seemingly does not acknowledge that the facets of subjectivity which he advances in his argument – i.e. effective-history, language, prejudice and tradition – may lose their power through the process of self-reflection: ‘The substantiality of what is historically pre-given does not remain unaffected when it is taken up by reflection. A structure of preunderstanding or prejudgment that has been rendered transparent can no longer function as a prejudice’ (Habermas, 1977:358). In effect, **Gadamer wants both to argue that tradition can be criticised** and critically reconstructed **and** at the same time maintain **that** human **subjectivity** – historically effected consciousness – **is dependent on tradition**. Either tradition grounds subjectivity or subjectivity grounds tradition. The ‘prior consensus’ that Habermas identifies in Gadamer’s work operates as an ideal (Habermas, 1986b:313), but it is free-floating and ungrounded. Insofar as human beings have critical capacities for Gadamer, they are just one form of conventional ability among others. This necessarily makes Gadamer a conservative, for whom there is no horizon beyond the fusion of horizons. Nonetheless, Gadamer insists that both reflective recognition (that is, 107recognition of authority) and reflective retrieval (that is, retrieval of a particular tradition), can work as critique. Consequently Gadamer rejects Habermas’s charge that tradition-contextual embeddedness does not successfully establish the difference between ‘counterfactual’ (critically reflective, rational) and ‘prior’ (unreflective) agreement (Rasmussen, 1990:38-45). However, Habermas insists that **the ultimate test of the rationality of** a **tradition is our capacity to reject it**. And this is an option which is not open to Gadamer. If we cannot reject tradition then we have to conclude that its foundation is dogmatic and tradition is a ‘cage’ from which we cannot escape. Tradition then constitutes a set of pre-given norms and prejudices. Gadamer can only legitimately talk about criticism and the non-coercive nature of tradition and authority if he posits a concept of critical reflection that allows for the possibility that prejudices can fall away (Habermas, 1977:359). **Gadamer’s notion of reflection ‘could only move within the limits of** the **facticity of tradition**. The act of recognition that is mediated through reflection would not at all have altered the fact that tradition as such remains the only ground of the validity of prejudices’ (Habermas, 1977:358). For Gadamer – on Habermas’s account – objective tradition is the sole basis for a reflective act (Habermas, 1977:359). As argued in Chapter 3, this may be described as a Heideggerian manifestation of the conception of the ‘fore-structure’ of understanding, which underpins the idea that people are ‘thrown’ into the world that is already a ‘given’.

Gadamer’s understanding of tradition as grounded in language can’t account for power hierarchies

**Kim 11** summarizes Habermas[[25]](#footnote-25)

Moreover, **Gadamer is further criticised** by Habermas **for viewing tradition as ‘linguistic’** in character30 (Habermas, 1986b:303). Given the central role language plays in Habermas’s own work it is important to grasp the nature of Habermas’s criticism. Habermas brings together three different considerations that underlie Gadamer’s use of the concept of language. Firstly, all understanding is rooted in tradition. Secondly, all understanding and comprehension has a fundamentally linguistic nature. And thirdly, language comprises tradition (Gadamer, 1989:389; Pannenberg, 1970:123). Thus tradition and language are identified with one another. Habermas argues that ‘linguistic tradition’ is divorced from any non-linguistic, material interests. The result is that **the model of dialogue presented by Gadamer is not adequate to** the **reality of communication, because it denies** the **existence of power hierarchies**, with the model instead taking the stance that there is only symmetrical or mutual communication (Habermas, 1977:360). This contrasts with Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality which subjects everyday distorted communication to criticism through the counterfactually presupposed validity claims. **Critique, on Gadamer’s account of communication, can only extend as far as identifying misunderstandings and is therefore unable** to clarify or **explain power and domination and their** respective **non-linguistic means** (Habermas, 1988:172).

### Poverty Turn

**Martin Luther King is a moral authority, not an empirical authority. We should trust MLK that poverty is bad but not that a living wage is a good response to poverty. You should prefer empirical authorities on the link-level question of whether living wage achieves MLK’s desired ends.**

**Living wage causes poverty; consensus of economists**

**Quigley 1**

William Quigley, Law Professor-Loyola University New Orleans, 2001, "Full Time Workers Should Not Be Poor: The Living Wage Movement," Mississippi Law Journal, Spring, 70 Miss. J.J. 889, p. 935-6

Opponents of living wages argue that these ordinances could potentially increase the local poverty rate and cost too much. A survey of over 300 economists conducted in 2000 for the Employment Policies Institute, a nonprofit research organization generally opposed to raises in both the minimum wage and the enactment of living wage ordinances, found that nearly eight in ten of the labor economists surveyed thought living wage ordinances would result in employers hiring higher skilled workers, and over 70% said the laws could potentially reduce the number of entry-level jobs and thus increase the local poverty rate. [n180](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n180) The opposition also suggests that living wage ordinances increase the cost of governmental contracts. Pasadena, California, estimated their living wage ordinance cost to be about $ 200,000 for the year 2000; Cambridge, Massachusetts, estimated its cost at $ 300,000; Madison, Wisconsin, estimated its cost at $ 47,000. [n181](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n181) While there is certainly some cost associated with living wages, this article will not join in the aforementioned melee of economists. Others disagree. [n182](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.422568.3809552412&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059172089&parent=docview&rand=1417474365802&reloadEntirePage=true#n182)

### Ayn Rand Turn

A living wage is government interference in the free market

**Phillips 13** writes[[26]](#footnote-26)

The focus on wages reverses cause and effect. The focus on wages is a focus on consumption—what a worker can buy from his wages. But an individual cannot consume until he produces, unless he wishes to live as a parasite. Government intervention impedes production. Government intervention prevents individuals from starting businesses, creating jobs, developing new products or processes. **Government intervention prevents individuals from acting on their own judgment**. If someone wants to offer a job with a pay of $2 an hour, he should be free to do so. If he cannot attract enough workers at that wage, he will need to offer more or go out of business. If a worker is willing to work for $2 an hour, why should anyone prevent him from doing so? **If the business owner judges that a job is only worth $2 an hour, he should be free to act** on his own judgment**. If a worker judges that** a job paying **$2 an hour is his best opportunity, he should be free to act** on his own judgment. Government intervention in the employer/employee relationship prohibits each from acting as he thinks best for his own life. Like all advocates of government intervention, the **advocates of a “living wage” believe that they know what is best for other** individual**s. They are willing to use government coercion to dictate** how others may live **their lives**. Ironically, and sadly, while advocating a “living wage” they simultaneously seek to prohibit others from actually living.

People don’t have a positive right to basic goods

**Rand 63** writes[[27]](#footnote-27)

**Jobs, food, clothing**, recreation (!), homes, medical care, education, etc., **do not grow in nature.** These are man-made values- goods and services produced by men. **Who is to provide them? If some** men **are entitled by right to the products of** the **work of others,** it means that **those others are** deprived of rights and **condemned to slave labor**. Any alleged “right” of one man, which necessitates the violation of the rights of another, is not and cannot be a right. No man can have a right to impose an unchosen obligation, an unrewarded duty or an involuntary servitude on another man. **There can be no such thing as “the right to enslave”. A right does not include** the **material implementation** of that right by other men; **it includes only the freedom to earn that implementation by one’s own effort.**

The rich are comparatively better moral authorities

**Mohanty 12** writes[[28]](#footnote-28)

Do we exalt the John Galts and Howard Roarks among us or despise them? Do we admire the ultimate, self-centered and selfish capitalists or the selfless, self-sacrificing altruists? Oh **sure there are** the **M**artin **L**uther **K**ing, Jr.**s and** Mahatma **Gandhis and** Nelson **Mandelas** and Aung Sun Suu Kyis **we like to point to as** icons and **worthy role models** for our children. **But** look deeply and we find that **we are obsessed with the wealthy**. And who are the wealthy? Why do **we let** the Robert Rubins, Sandy Weills, Jakc Welchs, Jamie Dimons and their **Wall St. brethren keep their millions? Because we consider that** right and **their right**. Let alone the hedge fund people whose entire purpose is to become billionaires. How many people explicitly make life choices that will lead to a life of service -> not be a charlatan like Mother Teresa but just helping the underprivileged without trying to 'achieve' greatness by so doing. So Lance Armstrong and Greg Mortensen and the Evangelical Christian blowhards such as Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell don't count. All the Indian Hindu godmen -- who are too numerous to make a comprehensive list -- are in it to become gods themselves. I hope nobody thinks for a moment that a Sai Baba or Ravi Shankar or Ram dev or the others are in it to do 'service.' Think of the obsessive listing of the wealthy in the media -> what does that show except that We The People are obsessed with wealth and the wealthy. Think of the self-promotional crazy stunts of the Hollywood celebrities who are clearly not in the business of doing charity by any stretch of the imagination. Coming down from these Olympian levels to levels of ordinary mortals like you and me, what motivates the average successful individual? Take a doctor. There are hundreds of thousands if not millions of doctors in the world. Who goes to the top of that pyramid? There are only a few doctors who reach the top of their chosen profession of medicine - they are the top dogs, the chairmen of depts. at academic medical centers, the consultants to the big pharma companies, the rock stars of the various medical disciplines like cancer or heart or brain surgery, the doctors who have built enough of  a name for themselves that the average public has heard of them. These are the doctors who manage to make in excess of a million dollars in the U.S. Take teachers. There are thousands and hundreds of thousands of them. But only a few reach the top of this mountain. The teachers who are professors at the Ivy League universities, who write books, or appear on TV, or go on the lecture circuit, perhaps serve in the govt. for a while, head think tanks -> think Condolezza Rice and Elizabeth Warren or Michael Sandel and Niall Ferguson. Take sportspersons. Is it even POSSIBLE to think of top sportspersons separately from their multi-million endorsement deals? Who is the exception? Not Tiger Woods. Neither Roger Federer nor Michael Schumacher. And surely not David Beckham. You can add any famous footballer, or basketball player or tennis player or baseball player or Formula One driver or boxer. They do it for the money. The 'closest' way to be a follower of the Dr. Kings and Gandhis would be to enter public service. How many leaders on the world stage can you name who are in public service primarily to do selfless service? At worst, elected leaders of nations can turn into Hitlers. But even at their best, democratic nations have produced leaders like George W. Bush or Tony Blair. Indian democracy seems to be faithful not to a republican ideal but to some older, apparently ingrained desire to elect leaders belonging to the same family generation after generation. All democracies appear to be flawed to various degrees. And yet, these are the 'democracies.' Nobody expects Iran, North Korea, or Cuba, or Venezuela to come up with the next Gandhi. Leaders of nations never fail to extol the 'courage' and 'sacrifice' of the troops belonging to their nations. So Obama will say that America's fighting forces are the best and finest forces in the world and the men and women 'serving' in those forces make incredible 'sacrifices' for their country everyday. The French President will say the same about the French soldiers. The Indian Prime Minister will say the same things as well -> about bravery and courage and sacrifice. I think we all understand the lie in this and let it be. The troops are not in the military because they want to make sacrifices for their country but because of other personal factors -> may be they wanted to be fighter pilots or be at the cutting edge of technology or they come from poor families and the military seemed a nice enough career option from a financial perspective. The Obama and Democratic doctrine in the U.S. of sturdier social safety nets and a move towards universal healthcare and greater government role in providing various services to the citizens finds favor with the citizens precisely because there are so many millions of people who are dependent on these services and safety nets. If I am a Medicare beneficiary and fight to continue to be one and want to vote and vote for the guy who'll assure me that it ain't going anywhere, then I am not doing anything altruistic, am I? Even women appear to have realized that they will have greater power over men by 'withholding' the only currency they have -> that of sex. So from a peak of a permissive and pervasive culture of sex, we see women retreating towards some ideal of monogamy - or at at least giving importance to traditional social structures such as marriage (followed by monogamy). Perhaps **nothing exemplifies** the fundamental self-centeredness and **selfishness** of human beings **as the fact of** there being such **income disparities** within and among nations on one planet. We have not really learned that we are one species, have we? We are still Americans and Canadians and French and British and Germans and Russians and Japanese. Oh, these are merely the rich folks of the world. The advanced, wealthy nations of the world at best have a total combined population of one billion. The rest of the global population (six billion plus) is poor. Even within these rich countries, the poor are taken care of to varying degrees - in the Scandinavian nations, or in Japan, a sense of equity and inclusiveness exists; the poor are taken care of by the government, the old receive free medical care or pensions. In America, people are less entitled to government stuff - though there's Medicare and Medicaid, there's no national government-funded and government-run healthcare system. But beyond these tiny islands of wealth and the even tinier islands of wealth in the Middle East, there exist these vast oceans of povery across much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Millions of people existing on the edge of starvation and death. If humans were not selfish, with all the knowledge and technology at our disposal, people in the developed nations would have pushed their governments to do more to eradicate some of the completely unnecessary deaths from easily curable diseases that is still so commonplace in so many parts of the world. Are you thinking -> "Well, why would the average American or Canadian or French citizen think about grinding poverty in Africa and India?" Well, exactly. They don't. They are too busy with their own lives. Which explains why we see so much coverage in the media about the challenges of bringing up kids in the age of Ritalin and Facebook. We see coverage about homes that cost a million dollars and other homes that cost 50 or 100 million dollars. And cars that cost 100,000 dollars to a million dollars. We have the ridiculous state of affairs where people in the developed nations spend more on their pets than people in developing countries spend on their human babies. Which is why we have medicines for cancer that can cost 5,000 dollars per month - clearly out of reach for the billions who survive on less than a dollar a day. **Here's the contradiction people are living with** consciously or unconsciously. The average middle class person in the U.S. or Europe doesn't consider himself or herself to be a 'parasite' as Ayn Rand might. So **it's considered right** and correct **that the rich should** be asked to **pay their fair share of taxes** to the government **and the government should take care of the poor**, the elderly and those who are not able to fend for themselves. **At the same time, there's no law against becoming millionaires** or billionaires -> becoming wealthy is mostly celebrated. Making money is mostly a glorious activity and achievement in the rich societies. **So, people are in agreement with** Ayn **Rand when she says that the wealthy are the heroes and that free market economics is** the **right** policy choice. But people don't agree with Rand when she considers the poor to be 'parasites.' People are ok with government helping those who have fallen on hard times. Indeed, people want the government to do more -> particularly as more and more people are becoming prone to falling and indeed falling into hard times. The veterans, the elderly, the poor, the unemployed, etc. do not consider themselves to be parasites. The problem with this conception and formulation of a 'compassionate society' is that the compassion stops at the border. It's not clear why that should be so -- particularly in this age of the ubiquitous internet when the sufferings of anyone and everyone in the world living anywhere is instantaneously transmitted to every corner of the world by TV. Why is the suffering of the homeless kids in Florida more heart-wrenching than the suffering of the kids in Africa or Afghanistan or the suffering of the street kids in India. Why is it news if 'adult' children in the U.S. are 'moving in' with their parents because of the challenging economic environment? Are not there more challenging crises facing humans in poor countries of the world? What about the urban poor in India and China who live in very difficult circumstances -- perhaps in slums? The average middle class person in the West earning 30,000 dollars per annum would be virtually a millionaire in poor India or Africa. But the middle class folks in the rich nations don't feel that they have a 'duty' to be compassionate towards the poor and the suffering citizens and kids throughout the world. The **governments in** the **rich nations do not feel obliged to tax the middle class** heavily **and send the revenue** collected **to** the **poor nations. So** the **compassion** of the average American or European **extends** to the unfortunate citizen or kid **only within** the boundaries of **their own country**. A wonderful case of moral relativism indeed. Or **simple selfishness showing in the end that people operate in their minds in the way that** Ayn **Rand portrayed** -> though people may be ashamed to admit that in the exaggerated way in which Rand contrasts the 'heroes' and 'parasites' in her novels.

Ayn Rand is inspiring

**Murray 14** writes[[29]](#footnote-29)

Second, Ayn **Rand portrayed a world I wanted to live in**, not because I would be rich or powerful in it, but because it consisted of people I wanted to be around. As conditions deteriorate in “Atlas Shrugged,” the first person to quit in disgust at Hank Rearden’s steel mill is Tom Colby, head of the company union: For ten years, he had heard himself denounced throughout the country, because his was a ‘company union’ and because he had never engaged in a violent conflict with the management. This was true; no conflict had ever been necessary; Rearden paid a higher wage scale than any union scale in the country, for which he demanded—and got—the best labor force to be found anywhere. That’s not a world of selfishness or greed. It’s a world of cooperation and mutual benefit through the pursuit of self-interest, enabling satisfying lives not only for the Hank Reardens of the world but for factory workers. I still want to live there. That world came together **in** the chapters of **“Atlas Shrugged” describing Galt’s Gulch**, the chapters I most often reread when I go back to the book. The **great men and women** who have gone on strike are **gathered there**, sometimes working at their old professions, but more often being grocers and cabbage growers and plumbers, **because that’s the niche in which they can make a living**. In scene after scene, **Rand shows what such a community would be like, and it does not consist of isolated individualists** holding one another at arm’s length. **Individualists**, yes, but ones **who have fun in one another’s company**, care about one another, **and care for one another**—not out of obligation, but **out of** mutual respect and **spontaneous affection.**

### Rand O/W Pope Francis

Prefer Rand to Pope Francis—

The Pope’s rejection of capitalism means trusting in his “moral authority” is bad for the poor. Only free markets can help the poor; Argentina proves.

**Hudgins 13** writes[[30]](#footnote-30)

Francis I, the newly installed Pope, has called on Catholics to protect all humanity, “especially the poorest, the weakest, the least important, those whom Matthew lists in the final judgment on love: the hungry, the thirsty, the stranger, the naked, the sick and those in prison.” **If the Pope** really **wants to see** a world in which **all** people can **prosper, he needs to understand that the route** to that goal **is not** government **redistribution** of wealth or even private charity. **It is free markets**. Cry for Argentina **Consider his native** country of **Argentina**. **In the early twentieth century it was one of the top ten in GDP** and per capita income, giving rise to the saying “Rich as an Argentine.” It had first-world infrastructure—rail transport, electricity—thanks mainly to British capital, and a world-class agricultural sector, with its beef especially prized. Argentina was really a European country that just happened to be in South America. But **things went south with a military dictatorship** in the 1930s followed by the accession to power of the demagogue Juan Peron in 1945. He modeled the country’s economy after the “corporatism” pioneered by his recently-executed hero Benito Mussolini. **Government had a heavy hand in managing** the various sectors of **the economy**. When he was driven from power by another military coup, **his country’s economy was in shambles**. But in the following decades, the government never allowed true free markets to operate and the country went back and forth between unstable democracy and military juntas. So as the then-Archbishop Jorge Bergoglio of Buenos Aires, the now-new Pope was wrong to complain concerning his country that “the social-economic crisis and the resulting poverty has its causes in policies inspired by forms of neo-liberalism that considers earnings and market laws as absolute parameters, to the detriment of the dignity of persons and peoples.” In fact, the Heritage Foundation’s latest Index of Economic Freedom gave Argentina only a score of 46.7 out of 100, ranking it as the 160th freest economy. **Argentines don’t enjoy economic liberty**, “neo” or otherwise **but**, rather, **suffer under statism**. Perusing Peru If Pope Francis seeks economic salvation for the world, he might peruse The Other Path, the revolutionary 1987 book by Peruvian economist Hernando DeSoto. That author documented how in his own country the poor were kept in their place by government regulations that restricted economic freedom in order to protect corrupt vested interests. For example, DeSoto and his researchers found that it would take a poor Peruvian 289 days to get permission from the government to set up a small business with two sewing machines. To secure a piece of abandoned land would take nearly seven years. Because of heavy-handed regulations, the poor in Peru—and in most other less developed countries—simply operate in the “informal sector” or “black market.” Some 90 percent of the bus and public transportation in Lima was performed outside the law. Retail markets were mostly informal. So was housing construction. But while the informal sector affords the poor an opportunity to literally survive, it does not allow them to fully flourish. This is because their property and contracts are not protected by the law. So if Pope Francis wants to see the wealth-creating capacities of individuals unleashed, he should speak up loud and clear for private property rights in free markets. He might also read DeSoto’s follow-up book The Mystery of Capital, published in 2000, which details the legal structures needed to protect property. Moral challenge In his desire to help the poor, Pope **Francis** must face a moral challenge at the heart of his theology. Like his predecessors, this Pope is concerned about “materialism” and **speaks of self-sacrifice as the highest virtue. But are not better material conditions** just **what he wants for the poor?** But is it not “selfish” for the poor to desire such conditions and to seek them through their own honest efforts? Religions have always been at best confused on these goals. Perhaps deists two centuries ago might have argued that the “pursuit of happiness” was instilled in us by God and should be our highest goal as individuals. But that’s hardly what the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church is proposing. Pope Francis will have to wrestle with these theological conundrums. But if he’s serious about seeing a world in which all can prosper, he needs to understand that **individuals acting in their own self-interest**, dealing with their fellows based on mutual consent, **is the way to** such **earthly salvation.**

### Mr. Rogers Good

Mr. Rogers teaches us the importance of unconditional love. That justifies util.

**Tomasik 13** writes[[31]](#footnote-31)

"I'm glad you're the way you are" Fred **Rogers ended many episodes of Mister Rogers' Neighborhood with the reminder that "people can like you exactly as you are,"** an expression he learned from his grandfather. Episode 1606 of the program featured Lady Aberlin singing to Daniel the following song: 'From a display in one of the terminals at Pittsburgh International Airport which contains artifacts from Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, which was filmed in Pittsburgh.' Image by Greg Dunlap from Stockholm, Sweden. (from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Daniel\_Striped\_Tiger.jpg) This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license. I'm glad You're the way you are I'm glad You're you I'm glad You can do the things that you can do I like How you look I like the way That you feel I feel that you Have a right to be quite pleased with you I'm glad You're the way you are I think You're fine I'm glad You're the way you are The pleasure's mine It's good That you look the way you should Wouldn't change you if I could 'Cause I'm happy you are you. Importance of unconditional love Do these statements mean people shouldn't bother improving themselves? If others like them as they are, is there no incentive to get better at things? Well, it's possible that conditional love could force people to try harder in order to seek approval, but at what cost and for what benefit? I think the cost is big: If you're not certain that anyone loves you, life can seem very scary, hopeless, and pointless. And I think there are plenty of other factors motivating people to improve in areas that matter without trying to use love as another carrot and stick. When people are in a rough emotional situation, they may not even have the motivation or support to undertake self-improvement, and might either wallow in despair or seek approval in unproductive ways -- including, as the song hints, through trying to look more attractive on the outside. There's a time and place for incentives, but love by and for another person is one domain where trying to introduce incentives does more harm than good because of the nature of human psychology. Consider how popular the theme is in Christianity that God loves you no matter what: **This** is a powerful **idea** that **can transform people's lives**. Altruism as unconditional love I feel unconditional love for a person even at the same time that I might prefer him/her to be different. If the person is open to advice on changing, I'll suggest things, but at the same time, I feel that even if the person doesn't change, it's okay -- s/he is still a special individual whose feelings matter just the same. In my mind, **unconditional love is closely tied with util**itarianism**: When I realize that an organism feels happiness** and suffering**,** at that point **I realize that the organism** matters and **deserves care and** kindness. In this sense, you could say **the only "condition" of my love is sentience**. From "Then Your Heart is Full of Love" by Josie Carey Franz and Fred Rogers (1984): When your heart can sing another's gladness, Then your heart is full of love. When your heart can cry another's sadness, Then your heart is full of love. [...] When your heart has room for everybody, Then your heart is full of love. I'll close with another Fred Rogers song, possibly my favorite. It hints at this idea that the other person's feelings are the reason for our love of him or her. It's you I like, It's not the things you wear, It's not the way you do your hair-- But it's you I like. The way you are right now, The way down deep inside you-- Not the things that hide you, [...] I hope that you'll remember Even when you're feeling blue That it's you I like, It's you yourself, It's you, it's you I like.

Mr. Rogers is a role model—he teaches us important values

**FRC no date** writes[[32]](#footnote-32)

**A timeless collection of wisdom on love, friendship, respect, individuality, and honesty** from the man who has been a friend to generations of Americans. There are **few personalities** who **evoke** such **universal feelings of warmth as Fred Rogers**. An enduring presence in American homes for over 30 years, **his** plainspoken **wisdom continues to guide** and comfort **many**. The World According to Mister Rogers distills the legacy and singular worldview of this beloved American figure. An inspiring collection of stories, anecdotes, and insights--with sections devoted to love, friendship, respect, individuality, and honesty. The World According to Mister Rogers reminds us that there is much more in life that unites us than divides us.  Culled from Fred Rogers' speeches, program transcripts, books, letters, and interviews, along with some of his never-before-published writings, **The World According to Mister Rogers is a testament to** the legacy of **a man who** served and **continues to serve as a role model to millions.**

### Gandhi Bad

Gandhi was a racist.

**OFMI no date** writes[[33]](#footnote-33)

**Gandhi was passionately prejudiced towards black Africans**, as clearly displayed by his own writings over his 21-year stint in Gandhi’s writings during his 20 years in South Africa. **He** promoted racial hatred, in theory, and **campaigned for** racial **segregation**, in practice. **In his newspaper**, The Indian Opinion, **he frequently wrote diatribes against the black community**. Of particular concern to him was any contact between Indians and Africans. The following series of quotes, which is but a small selection of his extensive writings on the topic, documents Gandhi’s intense hatred for equal treatment of blacks and Indians, whether in culture or under the law. Indeed, his efforts to improve the status of the Indian community in South Africa were primarily focused on ensuring Africans were treated worse than Indians. His goal, thus was greater social inequality rather than universal equality. All **quotes** taken **from Collected Works of** Mahatma **Gandhi** (CWMG). Sept. 26, 1896: “Ours is one continual struggle against a degradation sought to be inflicted upon us by the Europeans, who desire to degrade us to the level of the raw Kaffir\* whose occupation is hunting, and whose sole ambition is to collect a certain number of cattle to buy a wife with and, then, pass his life in indolence and nakedness.” — Vol. 1, p. 410 Sept. 24, 1903: **“**We believe as much in the purity of race as we think they do… **We believe** also **that the white race of South Africa should be the predominating race.”** — Vol. 3, p. 256 Feb. 15, 1904: “Under my suggestion, the Town Council must withdraw the Kaffirs from the Location. About this mixing of the Kaffirs with the Indians, I must confess I feel most strongly. I think it is very unfair to the Indian population.” — Vol. 3, p. 429 Sept. 5, 1905: **“The decision to open the school for all Coloured children is unjust to the Indian community**, and is a departure from the assurance given… that the school will be reserved for Indian children only**.”** — Vol. 4, p. 402 Sept. 2, 1907: “From these views expressed by a White we have a lesson to learn: We must encourage the Whites too. It is a short-sighted policy to employ, through sheer niggardliness, a Kaffir for washing work. If we keep in view the conditions in this country and patronize the Whites, whenever proper and necessary, then every such White will serve as an advertisement for the Indian trader.” — Vol. 6, p. 276 Feb. 29, 1908: “The British rulers take us to be so lowly and ignorant that they assume that, like the Kaffirs who can be pleased with toys and pins, we can also be fobbed off with trinkets.” — Vol. 8, p. 167 Mar. 7, 1908: “We were all prepared for hardships, but not quite for this experience. We could understand not being classed with the whites, but to be placed on the same level with the Natives seemed too much to put up with.” — Vol. 8, p. 198

### Gandhi 🡪 Jesus 🡪 Util

Gandhi would default to Jesus. He represents the perfection of all virtues.

**Mahatma Gandhi** writes[[34]](#footnote-34)

[All ellipses were in the original text.] Love is the strongest force the world possesses. And yet it is the humblest imaginable. The more efficient a force is, the more silent and subtle it is. Love is the subtlest force in the world. **When I read the Sermon on the Mount, especially such passages as ‘Resist not evil,’ I was simply overjoyed** and found my own opinion confirmed where I least expected it. **The message of Jesus Christ**, as I understand it, **is contained in the Sermon on the Mount**… which competes, on almost equal terms, with the Bhagavad Gita for the domination of my heart. It is **that sermon which had endeared Jesus to me. The gentle figure of Christ, so patient, so kind, so loving, so full of forgiveness that he taught his followers not to retaliate when abused** or struck **but to turn the other cheek… it was a beautiful example**, I thought, **of the perfect man.**

Jesus devolves to util. **Mill 63** writes[[35]](#footnote-35)

I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. **In the golden rule of Jesus** of Nazareth, **we read** the complete spirit of the ethics of **util**ity. **To** do as you would be done by, and to **love your neighbour as yourself, constitute[s]** the ideal perfection of **util**itarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, **util**ity **would enjoin**, first, **that laws** and social arrangements **should place the happiness**, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, **of every individual**, **as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole**; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the 20/John Stuart Mill universal happiness prescribes; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being’s sentient existence. If the, impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their own minds in this its, true character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to it; what more beautiful or more exalted developments of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving effect to their mandates.

# Other

## AT Rawls Self-Respect FW

### Unemployment Turn

#### Unemployment Turns The FW

Zaino, 1998:

(Self-Respect And Rawlsian Justice. The Journal Of Politics. Vol. 60, No. 3. August 1998. Pp. 737-753. Jeanne S. Zaino, Ph.D. and Professor of Political Science At Iona College.)

Moreover, Rawls's definition of self-respect suggests that individuals who are unemployed,7o r unable to work for whateverr eason,8w ill not feel a diminished sense of worth. They are instead expected to feel secure that their plan of life is worthwhile and be confident in their ability to carry it out, despite the fact that this may be difficult, if not impossible, in some instances. So while it is possible that midway through life individuals may find themselves unable to work and therefore unable to carry out their life plans, presumably Rawls expects that they will accept this situation and adjust their life plans accordingly. Moreover, they are apparently not expected to experience a diminished sense of worth. That this is likely, or even probable, is an issue that Rawls never addresses.

### Inequality Turn

#### **Inequality Turns The FW**

Zaino, 1998:

(Self-Respect And Rawlsian Justice. The Journal Of Politics. Vol. 60, No. 3. August 1998. Pp. 737-753. Jeanne S. Zaino, Ph.D. and Professor of Political Science At Iona College.)

While Rawls clearly regards self-respect as a cornerstone of any theory of justice, his conception of self-respect creates problems for his theory as a whole. A common criticism of Rawls's theory is that it fails to take into account the fact that disparities in socioeconomic status may have a negative impact on self-respect (Miller 1978, 18). Brian Barry (1973) writes, "That equality of self-respect may be as much or more hindered by inequalities of wealth or power themselves apparently does not occur to Rawls" (32). A close examination of Rawls's theory reveals to the contrary, however, that the fact that socioeconomic inequalities may undermine self-respect does indeed "occur to Rawls." Rawls not only makes reference to the relationship between socioeconomic inequalities and self-respect, but he goes to great lengths to hide the disparities between "non-comparing groups" so as not to undermine the sense of worth of the most disadvantaged or the stability of society as a whole. I argue that Rawls needs to confront the possible influence of socioeconomic inequalities on self-respect. His conception of self-respect opens him up to charges of inconsistency and, more importantly, underminesh is ability to deliver on the promise of equality. Moreover, it raises serious doubt as to whether his theory is as "democratic and egalitarian"a s he claims (Keat and Miller 1974, 24).

### General

#### **Rawls’ Self-Respect Is Communal; His FW Can’t Survive The Real World**

Zaino, 1998:

(Self-Respect And Rawlsian Justice. The Journal Of Politics. Vol. 60, No. 3. August 1998. Pp. 737-753. Jeanne S. Zaino, Ph.D. and Professor of Political Science At Iona College.)

Despite Rawls's contention that his solution to support self-respect is "the best" remedy (1971, 546), I argue that his remedy is not sound for a variety of reasons. For instance, in his discussions of the difference principle, envy, and the grounds for the priority of liberty, Rawls contradicts his own conclusion that self-respect is related solely to basic rights and liberties. Moreover, he attempts to ensure self-respect by advocating a segregated community made up of various "noncomparing groups." Thus, an individual's sense of worth depends on validation by those in his or her association, who happen to be the person's relative equals. This solution is not adequate, however, because people are bound to venture out of their associations into the community at large. In order to ensure that a person's sense of worth is not diminished if he or she is confronted by the disparities between "non-comparing groups," Rawls goes so far as to suggest that the most advantaged in a well-ordered society should refrain from ostentatious displays of their primary goods in order to lessen the visibility of these disparities.

#### Not Cut

Zaino, 1998:

(Self-Respect And Rawlsian Justice. The Journal Of Politics. Vol. 60, No. 3. August 1998. Pp. 737-753. Jeanne S. Zaino, Ph.D. and Professor of Political Science At Iona College.)

Self-respect is a primary good because it gives a person the sense that his or her plan of life is worthwhile and its fulfillment is of value. Therefore, it is a good that Rawls (1971) contends the parties in the original position would wish to secure "at any cost" (440). If, however, the parties wish to avoid those "social conditions that undermine self respect . . . at any cost" and they know various "facts about human society . .. the laws of human psychology and [other] gen-eral facts affect[ing] the choice of the principles of justice" (Rawls 1971, 440, 137), it raises the question of whether they would in fact choose the two princi-ples of justice9 on the grounds that a society with potentially large disparities in socioeconomic conditions may in fact undermine self-respect. Rawls guards against this possibility in two ways. First, he rejects the notion that there is a relationship between socioeconomic conditions and self-respect. The problematica nd contradictoryn atureo f this assumptionw ill be discussed in section IV However, if this assumption is not convincing, he also claims that the parties "would accept a natural duty of mutual respect which asks them to treat one another civilly and to be willing to explain the grounds of their actions, es-pecially when the claims of others are overruled" (Rawls 1971, 178-79). The natural duty of mutual respect creates at least three problems for Rawls.10 First, the idea that the parties could accept a natural duty is in itself a contradic-tion in light of Rawls's insistence that natural duties "apply to us without regard to our voluntary acts . . . whether or not we have committed ourselves to these actions" (Rawls 1971, 114-15). In discussing "a fundamental natural duty . the duty of justice . . . [that] [r]equires us to support and to comply with just in-stitutions that exist and apply to us," Rawls points out that everyone is "bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts" (1971, 115). Thus, the prin-ciples of natural duty "do not presuppose an act of consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in order to apply" (115). Moreover, the "natural duty of justice ... binds citizens generally and requires no voluntary acts in order to apply" (116). Second, if the parties have a natural duty of mutual respect, they should have this duty regardless of whether they choose the two principles of justice or not. In other words, because the duty is natural, it exists regardless of which concep-tion of justice they choose. Rawls claims that "[t]he fact that justice as fairness gives more support to self-esteem than other principles is a strong reason for them to adopt it" (1971, 440). However, a natural duty of mutual respect implies, to the contrary, that justice as fairness could not secure self-respect better than other principles because mutual respect is assured regardless of which concep-tion of justice the parties agree to. Thus, it is possible that the parties could choose any conception of justice (122-26) and still be assured that their self-respect would not be undermined. Finally, the natural duty of mutual respect conflicts with Rawls's account of the relationship between self-respect and "rational prudential choice" (1971, 584). Rawls argues that his account of the desire for primary goods in general, and self-respect in particular, rest on "general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life" (253). Rawls (1971) assumes that it is "clearly ra-tional for men to secure their self-respect" (178-79). The rationality of the parties in the original position means that "in choosing between principles each tries as best he can to advance his interests" (142). The question then arises: how can self-respect rest on both a natural duty and rational prudential choice? The notion of a natural duty would seem to preclude the possibility that the parties choose to secure self-respect because it is to their advantage. A natural dutywould presumably not involve any choice at all, rational or otherwise. Thus, while Rawls rests the decision of the parties to secure self-respect on both a nat-ural duty and rational prudential choice, the conflicting nature of these two claims is never addressed.

#### Not Cut

Zaino, 1998:

(Self-Respect And Rawlsian Justice. The Journal Of Politics. Vol. 60, No. 3. August 1998. Pp. 737-753. Jeanne S. Zaino, Ph.D. and Professor of Political Science At Iona College.)

One of the main problems with self-respect in the Rawlsian paradigm is that it rests on the assumption that self-respect is secured by legally prescribed rights and liberties, not socioeconomic status. There are many instances in A Theory of Justice in which Rawls describes the relationship between self-respect and basic rights and liberties. For example, he writes that "equal political rights . . . enhance the self-esteem" of the average citizen (234). Similarly, theseee free-doms [equal political liberty] . . . strengthen men's sense of their own worth" (234), and "the contract conception of justice supports the self-esteem of citizens generally more firmly than other political principles" because "[i]n the public forum each person is treated with the respect due to a sovereign equal; and everyone has the same basic rights" (536). Moreover, "[i]n a well-ordered soci-ety then self-respect is secured by the public affirmation of the status of equal citizenship for all" (Rawls 1971, 545; 1993, 76-77, 318-20). It is important to note that the argument here is not with Rawls' assumption that there is a relationship between equal rights and liberties and self-respect, but with the accompanying suggestion that inequalities in socioeconomic status will not undermine self-respect. For instance, he writes that "[t]he basis of self-esteem in a just society is not then one's income share, but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties. And this distribution being equal, everyone has a similar and secure status when they meet to conduct the common affairs of the wider society. No one is inclined to look beyond the con-stitutional affirmation of equality for further political ways of securing his status" (Rawls 1971, 544). Moreover, he notes that "while the social and eco-nomic differences between the various sectors of society, the non-comparing groups as we may think of them, are not likely to generate animosity, the hard-ships arising from political and civic inequality, and from cultural and ethnic discrimination, cannot be easily accepted" (545). The main problem with this as-sumption is that it contradicts statements Rawls makes acknowledging the possibility that inequities in socioeconomic condition may undermine self-respect. 12

#### Not Cut

Zaino, 1998:

(Self-Respect And Rawlsian Justice. The Journal Of Politics. Vol. 60, No. 3. August 1998. Pp. 737-753. Jeanne S. Zaino, Ph.D. and Professor of Political Science At Iona College.)

Self-respect is a communitarian aspect of Rawlsian justice in that one's sense of worth depends on validation from others in the community.14 Rawls notes: "[O]ur self-respect normally depends upon the respect of others. Unless we feel that our endeavors are honored by them, it is difficult if not impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing" (1971, 178). Thus, self-respect contains a notion of reciprocity-it is "reciprocally self-supporting" in that one's sense of worth needs to be confirmed by others (178-79).15 In order for citizens to respect themselves and others, their common plans must be both "rational and complimentary" (441). So we begin to see in Rawls a fairly compelling picture of a well-ordered society based on the two principles of justice in which one's sense of worth can be achieved only in relationship to others. This account would seem to require a strong sense of community in which the natural talents and abilities of all are a collective asset to be shared and enjoyed by the community as a whole (Alejandro 1993). However, the compelling nature of this account fits uncomfortably with what we see when we look at the segregated notion of community Rawls has in mind and the nature of the social union of social unions. The fact that Rawls attempts to limit comparisons across socioeconomic lines by segregating people in communities of equals who can appreciate their plans and validate their sense of worth without drawing attention to the inequalities in society at large is further evidence that he is indeed aware of the potentiallyproblematic relationship between self-respect and large disparities in socioeco-nomic status. Rawls suggests that our self-respect is dependent on our endeavors being ap-preciatedb y "others."B y "others"h e does not mean everyone in the community at large, but our "associates" in voluntary associations, which he calls "social unions." While the nature of a social union is not as developed as it might be, it is apparently a voluntary association devoted to a certain activity that satisfies the Aristotelian Principle and the companion principle which "implies that men appreciate and enjoy those attributes in one another as they are manifested in co-operating to affirm just institutions" (Rawls 1971, 528-29). Associations come in many types and sizes, ranging from family and friendships to groups that work together in science, art, and religion (440-41, 523-29). Rawls suggests that "for each person there is some association (one or more) to which he belongs and within which the activities that are rational for him to pursue are publicly affirmed by others" (441). Consequently, associations are made up of persons of similar abilities, natural assets, interests, and socio-economic status. In essence, they are made up of relative equals. That this is what Rawls has in mind is evident in various passages from both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. For instance, he notes that "men have varying capacities and abilities, and what seems challenging to some will not seem so to others. Yet in a well-ordered society anyway, there are a variety of communities and associations, and the members each have their own ideals appropriately matched to their aspirations and talents" (1971, 441). The "internal life of these associations is suitably adjusted to the abilities and wants" of its members (441-42). Moreover, he suggests that there will clearly be "social and economic differences between the various sectors of society, the non-comparing groups" (Rawls 1971, 545). He reiterates this idea in Political Liberalism when he notes that "variations and differences in natural gifts and abilities . .. become relevant only as we aspire to certain offices and positions, or belong to or wish to join certain associations" (Rawls 1993, 302). Consequently, it becomes clear that those who will affirm our sense of worth are our relative equals. This fact alone is not too troubling, until we consider it in conjunction with Rawls's efforts to hide the "variations in men's prospects" (1971, 536). Now that one's sense of worth is conveniently validated by one's relative equals, Rawls needs to ensure that if people venture out of their associations, they are not confronted by the potentially disturbing inequalities between "non-comparing groups." In his discussion of political participation, it becomes evident that some people may journey out of their associations into society at large (228-34). In an effort to avoid the loss of self-respect that could result if those who are worse off are confronted by the inequalities in society at large, Rawls suggests that the "plurality of associations in a well-ordered society, each with its secure internal life, tends to reduce the visibility, or at least the painful visibility, of variations in men's prospects" (536). Thus, his social union of socialdis-crepancies between which will not attract the "kind of attention which unsettles the lives of those less well placed" (537). Despite his suggestion, it is not alto-gether clear that he is as concerned with unsettling the lives of the disadvantaged as he is with securing their cooperation and promoting stability in society at large. Rawls goes on to argue that "this ignoring of difference in wealth and cir-cumstances is made easier by the fact that when citizens do meet one another, as they must in public affairs at least, the principles of equal justice are to be ac-knowledged" (537). But he does not rely on this alone; in one final attempt to ensure that socioeconomic inequalities do not have a negative impact on feelings of self-respect, he also suggests that the more advantaged should "not make an ostentatious display of their higher estate.... Taken together these features of a well-ordered regime diminish the number of occasions when the less favored are likely to experience their situation as impoverished and humiliating" (537). Rawls does not seem at all concerned with the apparent contradiction between his invisibility argument and his statement that certain ways of dealing with envy and other aberrant propensities are closed to a well-ordered society. For example, it cannot keep them in check by promulgating false or unfounded beliefs. For our problem is how society should be arranged if it is to conform to principles that ratio-nal persons with true general beliefs would acknowledge in the original position. (1971, 547) As Keat and Miller (1974) argue, "[T]hat the society's stability depends partly on its inequalities remaining invisible seems to be at variance with another general theme of [Rawls's] theory of justice: namely, that a theory is not acceptable if the stability of a society based upon it depends upon the members of that society not knowing its principles and the way it is organized" (24). They go on to suggest that while it is possible to argue that Rawls is not keeping the disadvantaged in check by promulgating false or unfounded beliefs, but merely by creating a sit-uation in which they do not think about variations in men's prospects very often, this argument is nevertheless built on a very loose interpretation of the "true-belief principles" (24). Not to mention that the invisibility argument, and the accompanying lowering of expectations among those who are worse off, seems to be out of place in a theory that purports, as Rawls's does, to be both demo-cratic and egalitarian. Consequently, despite Rawls's compelling account of the communitarian na-ture of self-respect, human sociability, and the social union of social unions in which natural talents are collective assets, this discussion fits uncomfortably with his conception of a segregated community in which disparities in socioeconomic status are hidden. In essence his rhetoric obscures the reality of a highly segre-gated society in which an individual's self-respect depends on validation by those in their association who are their relative equals. Rawls's conception of self-respect insures that if individuals venture outside of their association and are confronted (despite his efforts to ensure otherwise) with others in "non-comparing groups," they will not experience a diminished sense of worth because their self-respect depends not on their socioeconomic position, but on legally prescribed rights and liberties shared equally by all.

## AT: 1AR Util K

### Framing

If I win any reason the K is false, vote neg; 4 reasons.

1. Accusations that I’m making debate unsafe shouldn’t be taken lightly. Make him commit to this argument.

2. Dropping him deters false accusations of making debate unsafe which trade off with more legitimate efforts in the activity.

3. My arguments prove util should be the preferred framework. He doesn’t have util offense, so at that point you can only negate.

4. It’s key to compensate for the time I spent responding. Otherwise it’s no-risk for the aff.

### AT Intrinsic Value

Util wouldn’t entail rampant racism in practice. Very few things cause more suffering than racism, and a choice between racism and those kinds of suffering doesn’t arise for most decision-makers.

Not unique to util and alternatives are worse

**Pettit 99** writes[[36]](#footnote-36)

**It is usually said** against **consequentialism** that it would lead an agent to do horrendous deeds, so long as they promised the best consequences. It **would forbid nothing absolutely**: not rape, not torture, not even murder. **This** charge is on target but it **is only relevant** of course **in horrendous circumstances**. Thus if someone of ordinary values condoned torture, that would only be in circumstances where there was a great potential gain – the saving of innocent lives, the prevention of a catastrophe – and where there were not the bad consequences involved, say, in state authorities claiming the right to torture. Once it is clear that the charge is relevant only in horrendous circumstances, it ceases to be clearly damaging. After all **the non-consequentialist will** often **have to defend an equally unattractive response** in such circumstances. **It may be awful to think of torturing** someone **but it must be equally awful to** think of not doing so and **consequently allow**ing, say, **a massive bomb to go off in some public place.**

If the alt prevents us from minimizing the suffering of others, it makes debate unsafe. Non-utilitarian theories often rely on the act-omission distinction which justifies being complicit in structural violence.

Util can account for characteristically deontological rules without deeming them correct for deontological reasons

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[37]](#footnote-37)

But if you are running on corrupted hardware, then the reflective observation that it seems like a righteous and altruistic act to seize power for yourself—this seeming may not be be much evidence for the proposition that seizing power is in fact the action that will most benefit the tribe. By the power of naive realism, the corrupted hardware that you run on, and the corrupted seemings that it computes, will seem like the fabric of the very world itself—simply the way-things-are. And so we have the bizarre-seeming rule: "For the good of the tribe, do not cheat to seize power even when it would provide a net benefit to the tribe." Indeed it may be wiser to phrase it this way: If you just say, "when it seems like it would provide a net benefit to the tribe", then you get people who say, "But it doesn't just seem that way—it would provide a net benefit to the tribe if I were in charge." The notion of untrusted hardware seems like something wholly outside the realm of classical decision theory. (What it does to reflective decision theory I can't yet say, but that would seem to be the appropriate level to handle it.) But on a human level, the patch seems straightforward. Once you know about the warp, you create rules that describe the warped behavior and outlaw it. A rule that says, "For the good of the tribe, do not cheat to seize power even for the good of the tribe." Or "For the good of the tribe, do not murder even for the good of the tribe." And now **the philosopher comes and presents their "thought experiment**"—setting up a scenario **in which**, by stipulation, **the only possible way to save five** innocentlives **is to murder one** innocent person**, and this** murder **is certain to save the five** lives. "There's a train heading to run over five innocent people, who you can't possibly warn to jump out of the way, but you can push one innocent person into the path of the train, which will stop the train. These are your only options; what do you do?" An altruistic human, who has accepted certain deontological prohibits—which seem well justified by some historical statistics on the results of reasoning in certain ways on untrustworthy hardware—may experience some mental distress, on encountering this thought experiment. So **here's a reply to that** philosopher's **scenario**, which I have yet to hear any philosopher's victim give**: "You stipulate that** the only possible way to save five innocent lives is to murder one innocent person, and **this murder will definitely save the five** lives, **and that these facts are known to me with effective certainty. But since I am running on corrupted hardware, I can't occupy the epistemic state you want me to imagine**. Therefore I reply that, in a society of Artificial Intelligences worthy of personhood and lacking any inbuilt tendency to be corrupted by power, it would be right for the AI to murder the one innocent person to save five, and moreover all its peers would agree. However, I refuse to extend this reply to myself, because the epistemic state you ask me to imagine, can only exist among other kinds of people than human beings." Now, to me this seems like a dodge. I think the universe is sufficiently unkind that we can justly be forced to consider situations of this sort. The sort of person who goes around proposing that sort of thought experiment, might well deserve that sort of answer. But any human legal system does embody some answer to the question "How many innocent people can we put in jail to get the guilty ones?", even if the number isn't written down. **As a human, I try to abide by** the **deontological prohibitions that humans have made to live in peace** with one another. **But I don't think** that our **deontological prohibitions are** literally **inherently nonconsequentially terminally right**. I endorse "the end doesn't justify the means" as a principle to guide humans running on corrupted hardware, but I wouldn't endorse it as a principle for a society of AIs that make well-calibrated estimates. (If you have one AI in a society of humans, that does bring in other considerations, like whether the humans learn from your example.) And so I wouldn't say that a well-designed Friendly AI must necessarily refuse to push that one person off the ledge to stop the train. Obviously, I would expect any decent superintelligence to come up with a superior third alternative. But if those are the only two alternatives, and the FAI judges that it is wiser to push the one person off the ledge—even after taking into account knock-on effects on any humans who see it happen and spread the story, etc.—then I don't call it an alarm light, if an AI says that the right thing to do is sacrifice one to save five. Again, I don't go around pushing people into the paths of trains myself, nor stealing from banks to fund my altruistic projects. I happen to be a human. But for a Friendly AI to be corrupted by power would be like it starting to bleed red blood. The tendency to be corrupted by power is a specific biological adaptation, supported by specific cognitive circuits, built into us by our genes for a clear evolutionary reason. It wouldn't spontaneously appear in the code of a Friendly AI any more than its transistors would start to bleed. I would even go further, and say that if you had minds with an inbuilt warp that made them overestimate the external harm of self-benefiting actions, then they would need a rule "the ends do not prohibit the means"—that you should do what benefits yourself even when it (seems to) harm the tribe. By hypothesis, if their society did not have this rule, the minds in it would refuse to breathe for fear of using someone else's oxygen, and they'd all die. For them, an occasional overshoot in which one person seizes a personal benefit at the net expense of society, would seem just as cautiously virtuous—and indeed be just as cautiously virtuous—as when one of us humans, being cautious, passes up an opportunity to steal a loaf of bread that really would have been more of a benefit to them than a loss to the merchant (including knock-on effects). **"The end does not justify the means" is just consequentialist reasoning** at **one meta-level up**. If a human starts thinking on the object level that the end justifies the means, this has awful consequences given our untrustworthy brains; therefore a human shouldn't think this way. But it is all still ultimately consequentialism. It's just reflective consequentialism, for beings who know that their moment-by-moment decisions are made by untrusted hardware.

Absolutism can justify racism also. For example, a non-consequentialist theory could allow hate speech because the right to free speech is inviolable.

**Absolutism fails. It can’t explain empirical uncertainty. Inviolable rules like the aff’s may sound nice, but they can’t be action-guiding.**

**Jackson and Smith 6**

Frank Jackson (Australian National University) and Michael Smith (Princeton). “Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 103, No. 6 (June 2006), pp. 267-283. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20619943

A skier is heading in a direction you know for sure will trigger an avalanche that will kill ten people. You know the only way to save the ten people is for you to shoot him. The probability that the skier intends to trigger the avalanche and kill the ten people is 1-p. We can agree that our target absolutist theory says it is right for you to shoot if it is certain that the skier intends to kill the ten, that is, if p = 0, for in that case you would not be killing someone innocent—you would be protecting the ten in the only way possible from an unprovoked attack. We can agree that our target theory says that it would be wrong for you to shoot if you are certain he simply happens to be skiing in that direction, that is, if p = 1, for then you would be intentionally killing someone innocent, and that is never right no matter how many you will be allowing to die by your failure to shoot. The number of lives that would be saved in the example as described is ten, but of course the distinctive position of absolutism is that the number does not matter: it is never right intentionally to kill the innocent no matter how many lives would be saved by doing so. Our question is, What should the theory say for other values of p? III. THE INFINITE DISVALUE APPROACH Perhaps the simplest absolutist answer to our question is to hold that whenever there is any chance that an action violates an absolute prohibition, the action ought not to be performed. This is the answer suggested by the absolutists' case against early stage abortion summarized above. In our example, the answer would prohibit shooting the skier whenever there is any chance that he is innocent, whenever, that is, p < 1. One way of implementing this answer is to assign infinite disvalue to intentionally killing the innocent and some finite disvalue to allowing people to die. For then the expected disvalue of the shooting—that is, the product of the disvalue of intentionally killing the innocent times the chance that the shooting is an intentional killing of the innocent—will exceed the disvalue of allowing others to die, no matter how many others die and how certain it is that they will die, provided there is some chance that the shooting is indeed an intentional killing of the innocent. It will, on this approach, be impossible to make the action that has some chance of being the intentional killing of someone innocent the right thing to do by making the number allowed to die by refraining from shooting large enough—the numbers allowed to die will be irrelevant, just as absolutists typically say.6 The trouble with this response is that there is nearly always some greater than zero chance that someone is innocent. All the evidence may be against them, but induction from the past record of over turned verdicts in cases that looked watertight at the time tells us that there is nearly always some chance that someone who looks clearly to be guilty is in fact innocent. We will get the result that it is never, or hardly ever, right to shoot the skier. Indeed, it will be hard to find any cases where it is right intentionally to kill someone as there is always some chance that the someone is innocent, and a small chance times an infinite disvalue equals an infinite dis value. We will have a quick (too quick) argument from absolutism against intentionally killing the innocent to an extreme kind of personal pacifism.

A racist deontologist could wrongly claim black people aren’t rational in the same way they’d oppose animal rights because animals aren’t rational. If what actual deontologists say is justified means this is irrelevant, then what actual utilitarians say is justified means his kritik is also irrelevant.

No internal link to safe spaces. Policy debate is almost universally util, and it’s not more unsafe than LD is.

Util can account for intrinsic value of an action

**Williams 73** writes[[38]](#footnote-38)

[Brackets for gendered language] To insist that what has intrinsic value is states of affairs and not actions seems to come near an important feature of consequentialism. Yet it may be that we have still not hit exactly what we want, and that the restriction is now too severe. Surely some actions, compatibly with consequentialism, might have intrinsic value? This is a question which has a special interest for utilitarianism, that is to say, the form of consquentialism concerned particularly with happiness. Traditionally utilitarians have tended to regard happiness or, again, pleasure, as experiences or sensations which were related to actions and activity as effect to cause; and, granted that view, utilitarianism will indeed see the value of all action as derivative, intrinsic value being reserved for the experiences of happiness. But that view of the relations between action and either pleasure or happiness is widely recognized to be inadequate. **To say that a [hu]man finds certain actions** or activity **pleasant**, or that they make him happy, or that he finds his happiness in them, **is certainly not always to say that they induce certain sensations** in him, and in the case of happiness, it is doubtful whether that is ever what is meant. Rather it means such things (among others) as that **[s]he enjoys doing these things for their own sake**. It would trivialize the discussion of utilitarianism to tie it by definition to inadequate conceptions of happiness or pleasure, and **we must** be able to **recognize** as **versions of util**itarianism those **which**, as most modern versions do, **take as central** some notion such as **satisfaction**, and connect that criterially with such matters as the activities which a man will freely choose to engage in. But the **activities which a [hu]man engages in for their own sake are activities in which [s]he finds intrinsic value**. So any specification of consequentialism which logically debars action or activity from having intrinsic value will be too restrictive even to admit the central case, utilitarianism, so soon as that takes on a more sophisticated and adequate conception of its basic value of happiness.

This isn’t a reason to vote aff. It’s just framework defense; he’s arbitrarily avoiding contention debate.

### Extinction First

If the choice were actually racism versus extinction, extinction is clearly worse. They’d intuitively oppose a policy that might cause some racism but will certainly prevent the death of every single person because our brains can’t understand the scope of the harm of extinction. Util solves scope insensitivity, that’s Yudkowsky 8.

Our intuition that genocide is wrong requires minimizing existential risks

**Bostrom 13** writes[[39]](#footnote-39)

We might also consider the issue from a less theoretical standpoint and try to form an evaluation instead by considering analogous cases about which we have definite moral intuitions. Thus, for example, **if we feel** confident **that committing a small genocide is wrong, and that** committing **a large genocide is no less wrong, we might conjecture that committing omnicide is also wrong**. And if we believe we have some moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a small number of people, and a stronger moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a larger number of people, we might conjecture that **we have a**n even **strong**er **moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire human population.**

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